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 2 
              “There are (…) situations where an institution 
has its raison d’être, mission, wisdom, integrity, 
organization, performance, moral foundation, justice, 
prestige, and resources questioned and it is asked 
whether the institution contributes to society what it is 
supposed to  contribute” (March and Olsen, 2005)   
        “…pressures for organizational autonomy are 
like coiled springs precariously restrained by the 
counterforce of the state and ready to unwind 
whenever the system is jolted” (Dahl, 1982) 
1 Introduction (As if Society Doesn’t 
Matter…) 
The research reported in this thesis has been directed by three 
interconnected questions: 1) How can institutional theory contribute to 
our understanding of the contingent nature of CSR and manifestations 
of CSR within national-level fields? 2) What are the potential 
institutional and political implications of CSR? and 3) How can 
institutional theory contribute to discussions of a justified foundation 
for companies (political) efforts on the societal arena? 
Since the 1950s, the role of business in, and the responsibility of 
companies towards, society have increasingly been addressed in terms 
of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (Carroll, 1999, 2008; 
Frederick, 2006). Simply put, CSR refers to responsibilities that either a 
corporation has to society or responsibilities that society imposes on 
corporations (De George, 2008).   
The research on CSR is dominated by two broad strands of literatures 
(Gond, Palazzo, and Basu, 2009), the economic or instrumental 
approach to CSR (e.g., Friedman and Friedman, 1962; Friedman, 1970; 
Husted and Allen, 2000; Maignan and Ferrell, 2001, 2004; 
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McWilliams, Siegel, and Wright, 2006; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; 
Porter and Kramer, 2002, 2006), and the duty-aligned or ethical 
approach on CSR (e.g., Bowie, 1998; Cassel, 2001; Donaldson and 
Dunfee, 1999; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Mahon 
and McGowan, 1991; Melè, 2002; Shrivastava, 1995; Swanson, 1995, 
1999). Each approach holds – more or less explicitly – both 
positive/descriptive and normative ambitions. 
The inquiry of this thesis is informed by two concurrent observations. 
The first observation is that, within the Business and Society literature 
– and in particular within the instrumental and duty-aligned 
perspectives – the notion of CSR is often interpreted within the 
assumptions and aspirations of methodological individualism (e.g., 
Weber, 1968) and a social and political philosophy putting individual 
rather than collectives in the centre of its ideas about the ideal 
institutional order, and of theories on how to understand and explain 
societal phenomena.    
Methodological individualism is “the doctrine that all social 
phenomena – their structures and their change – are in principle 
explicable in ways that only involve individuals – their properties, their 
goals, their intentions, and their rational choices” (Elster, 1985, p. 5). 
As such, methodological individualism makes individuals – citizens, 
managers, consumers – and their choices the primary object of study 
(Petrovic, 2008). The analysis begins and ends with the individual 
rational calculation: societal phenomena must be explained by showing 
how they result from individual actions, which in turn must be 
explained through reference to the intentional states that motivate the 
individual actors (Heath, 2009). Methodological individualism does not 
deny the existence of social structures. These are social realities. But 
social structures – as institutions – should be understood and explained 
with reference to the individual characteristics of their constituents 
(Weber, 1968). 
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The basis of the instrumental and duty-aligned approaches to CSR 
within the assumptions and aspirations of methodological individualism 
has important implications for how the notion of CSR is understood, 
that is, what the notion contains, how responsible – or irresponsible – 
corporate action is, and of the variables that might promote responsible 
behaviour.  
In its positivist and descriptive outlook (e.g., Husted, 2003) the 
instrumental or strategic approach to CSR seeks to explain responsible 
– or irresponsible – corporate behaviour with reference to rational self-
seeking individuals’ (mostly corporate managers) pursuit of profit 
maximisation. In its normative outlook (e.g., Friedman and Friedman, 
1962; Friedman 1970), the instrumental or strategic approach justifies 
CSR solely on economic grounds. In slightly other words: business and 
companies may legitimately engage in CSR only when their underlying 
motivation is the attainment of financial performance.  
In its positivist and descriptive outlook, the duty-aligned or ethical 
approach to CSR seeks to explain corporate responsible – or 
irresponsible – behaviour with references to the values premises of 
individual preference-based action. In its normative outlook, the duty-
aligned or ethical approach justifies CSR on ethical grounds. In slightly 
other words, business and companies should engage in CSR because 
this is the right thing to do according to some ethical treaty, that, in 
turn, should inform moral reasoning and better individual decision-
making. 
The second observation informing the inquiry of this thesis – and one 
that is closely connected to the first observation – is that – within the 
Business and Society literature – the notion of CSR is often interpreted 
in apolitical terms. With this I mean that interpretations of CSR tend to 
ignore the specific political and institutional roots of CSR (Frederick, 
1987; Hanlon, 2008), it tends to ignore the political nature of the social 
institution of business, the corporate entity, and the activities 
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companies perform under the rubric of CSR (Crane, Matten, and Moon, 
2008; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007, 2008), and it tends to ignore the 
potential institutional and political implications of CSR (Barley, 2007; 
Vogel, 2005). This second observation can also be formulated as the 
logical implications of the assumptions of methodological 
individualism inherent in the instrumental and duty-aligned approaches 
to CSR. 
The convergent institutional perspective of CSR suggested in this thesis 
contrasts with the assumptions of methodological individualism that are 
inherent in both the instrumental and duty-aligned perspectives on 
CSR, and assumes that social reality contains “chunks of irreducible 
social matter” (van Oosterhout, 2002, p. 125), that through regulative, 
normative and cognitive institutions provide institutional logics 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2004) that inform specific  
manifestations of CSR within an institutional field (e.g. van Oosterhout 
and Heugens, 2008). An institutional approach to CSR thus questions 
the assumption of methodological individualism that unified individual 
subjects are the units of society and economic, social, and political 
behaviour. That means that rather than seeing challenges of corporate 
responsibility as residing primarily in the value premises of individual 
preference-based action – as assumed within instrumental and duty-
aligned perspectives – an institutional perspective assumes that 
challenges of corporate responsibility constitute an inherent aspect of 
the structures of political rules, institutions, and identities (e.g., March 
and Olsen, 1996). The position that social reality contains “chunks of 
irreducible social matter” does, however, not preclude the possibility of 
agency. Actors are capable of purposefully acting in pursuit of their 
own interest, potentially leading to both the maintenance and change of 
institutions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). At the same time, they do 
this within socially constructed frames, both constituting and limiting 
their purposefully interpretations and actions (Scott, 2008; Lounsbury, 
2008).    
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The institutional perspective on CSR in this thesis has not only 
positivist or descriptive, but also normative ambitions. That is, it is 
argued that the perspective holds promises for justificatory purposes, 
and hence can be used to outline criteria for probing into the question 
of why the social institution of business and companies has a 
responsibility towards society, and what constitutes the elements of this 
responsibility. The position taken is that political democracy and the 
pursuit of the common good not only depends on economic and social 
conditions, but also on the appropriate design and functioning of 
political institutions (March and Olsen, 1984). The perspective thus 
builds on a normative vision of a political order based upon institutions 
(Wolin, 1960, 2004) as its point of departure for descriptive analysis of 
the impact of diverse institutional variables on manifestations of CSR, 
and reasoning about the how to judge and evaluate the institutional and 
political implications of CSR and manifestations of the notion within 
institutional fields.  
In sum then, the thesis argues in favour of a convergent perspective 
(e.g., Jones and Wicks, 1999; Kochan, Guillen, and O’Mahony, 2009; 
Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Van Oosterhout and Heugens, 2009; Wicks 
and Freeman, 1998) of CSR in which descriptive and instrumental 
analysis is combined with normative assumptions about the preferred 
institutional order and prerequisites for organisational and corporate 
responsibility.   
1.1 Research aims  
This study sees the construct of CSR in terms of how to understand and 
conceptualise the organisation and responsible business activity1. Given 
                                                 
1 This point of departure builds on Wick’s and Freeman’s (1999) discussion of the 
nature of business ethics. 
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the puzzles of CSR as methodological individualism and the concurrent 
apolitical nature of the concept, the inquiry of this thesis has been 
directed by the aim of suggesting an institutional convergent alternative 
to the instrumental and duty-aligned CSR perspectives, and to arrive at 
insights into some possible building blocks of such a perspective. 
Within this framework, the inquiry has been directed by the following 
objectives:  
1. To explore the institutional contingent and embedded nature of the 
construct of corporate social responsibility 
 
2. To explore the potential political-institutional implications of 
corporate social responsibility 
 
3. To contribute to discussions about a justified foundation for 
companies efforts on the societal arena from an institutional point 
of view  
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of two parts. Part I contains the background for the 
study, research aims, theoretical framework and research questions, 
methodology, results, discussion and conclusion. The design and thus 
also the structure and disposition of this study reflects its theoretical 
more than its policy or empirical orientation. The context of the 
research has not primarily been some empirical real-life world of CSR, 
but rather the theoretically informed literature and constructs of 
business and society reflecting this world. Thus, relatively large 
emphasis is put on elaborating on the literature on CSR, and the 
institutional perspective from which I analyse and inquire into the 
notion of CSR.       
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Part II consists of the four research articles included in the thesis2: 
Article I. Blindheim, B-T. Multiple and Contesting Perceptions of 
Explicit Corporate Social Responsibility Within a National 
Institutionalised Field. Submitted February, 2008 for publication to 
Business and Society. New York: Sage Publisher. Revised February 
2009 and September 2009. 
Article II. Blindheim, B-T. (2008) Corporate Social Responsibility: 
The Economic and Institutional Responsibility of Business in Society. 
In Mikkelsen and Langhelle (Eds.), Arctic Oil and Gas – Sustainability 
at Risk? London and New York: Routledge.   
Article III. Blindheim, B-T. and Langhelle, O. (2010) Reinterpreting 
the Principles of CSR: A Pragmatic Approach. Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Environmental Management, 17: 107-117. John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd. and ERP Environment. 
Article IV. Blindheim, B-T, Øgaard, T. and Mikkelsen, A. 
Development and Validation of the CSR Issues Scale (CSRIS): A 
Corporate Citizenship Perspective. Submitted February 2010 for 
publication to Journal of Business Ethics. Springer.      
                                                 
2 In the following, I refer to the articles as “Article I”, “Article II”, “Article III” and 
“Article IV”. 
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2 Background: The Study Field of 
Business and Society 
This chapter first frames discussions about notions of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) within the dual notion of organisational 
autonomy and control (Dahl, 1982). The chapter then proceeds with a 
closer presentation of CSR as a definitional construct, and the different 
approaches towards the notion. As part of this presentation, I also 
present the study’s initial understanding of CSR.  
2.1 Autonomy and Control 
Discussions about the role and responsibility of business in society can 
be framed by what Dahl (1982) calls the fundamental problem of 
pluralist democracies, the dilemma between autonomy and control. In 
pluralist democracies, independent or autonomous organisations – like 
business organisations – can be understood as highly desirable and 
indeed necessary to the functioning of the democratic process itself, to 
minimising coercion, to protecting liberty, and to ensuring human well-
being and societal development in general. It can thus be argued that 
organisations – for the sake of democracy and the common good – 
ought to possess some autonomy in society. Valuable as organisational 
autonomy is for societal development and the pursuit of the common 
good, organisational autonomy also creates an opportunity to do harm 
(Dahl, 1982, p. 1):  
Organizations (like corporate entities) may use the opportunity 
to increase or perpetuate injustice rather than reduce it, to foster 
the narrow egoism of their members at the expense for a broader 
public good, and even to weaken or destroy democracy itself.    
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Although organisations ought to possess some autonomy in society, it 
can thus also be argued that organisations should be controlled. The 
dilemma between autonomy and control – or the problem of democratic 
pluralism – constitutes a central challenge of political life (Dahl, 1982):  
How much autonomy should be granted to which actor, in 
respect to what areas and action, and in relation to what other 
actors? And how much control ought to be exercised by what 
actors, employing what means of control over what other actors, 
and with respect to what actions?  
In more general terms, the problem of democratic pluralism comes 
close to a description of the entire project of political theory (Dahl, 
1982), and it can also serve as a framework for, or overriding issue 
within, the Study-Field of Business and Society3.  
The study-field of business and society is primarily concerned with the 
tension that arises from the interaction between the economic and the 
cultural, and political sphere of society, and the mechanisms to cope 
with this tension (Jones, 1983). As such, the social control of business – 
defined as the means by which society directs business activity to 
useful ends – constitutes the very essence of the field. Two questions 
are central to inquiries within the study-field (Jones, 1983): 1):  
How compatible are the outputs and processes of the economic 
system with the values of the cultural and political system (How 
                                                 
3 This research follows Lockett, Moon and Visser (2006), who defined Corporate 
Social Responsibility as a field of study rather than a discipline. While disciplines can 
be identified with references to their theoretically or methodologically distinctive 
approaches (as are economics, philosophy, and sociology), or through being 
substantively distinctive and systematic (as are political science and law), CSR does 
not meet even the more “relaxed” definition or criteria of a substantive discipline 
(Lockett, et al., 2006).   
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compatible are existing social control mechanisms?, and 2) How 
can the outputs and processes of the economic system be made 
more compatible with the values of the cultural and political 
systems? (How can social control mechanisms be improved?). 
Three broad strands of social control mechanisms can be outlined 
(Wood and Jones, 1995): public policy, market, and normative. CSR 
perspectives differ greatly in what strands are seen as relevant and 
appropriate. In general, while instrumental – or economic – approaches 
to CSR would emphasise the importance of market control mechanisms 
like consumer, owner, supplier, and competitor expectations and 
behaviours, ethical or duty-aligned perspectives would emphasise 
normative societal control mechanisms like moral suasion, symbols and 
references to values. In contrast to both the former, institutional 
approaches to CSR would emphasize the importance of public policy 
control mechanisms like laws, regulation, litigation, jurisgenerative 
politics, public discourses and democratic iterations (Benhabib, 2006, 
2008), in addition to normative and symbolic orders and structures.  
2.2 The Construct of CSR4 
A possible source for identifying the modern roots of CSR is the work 
of Berle and Means (1932). They documented a separation of 
ownership from control in large United States (US) corporations, thus 
resulting in a: 
“…small (managerial) group, sitting at the head of enormous 
organizations, with the power to build, and destroy, 
communities, to generate great productivity and wealth, but also 
to control the distribution of that wealth, without regard for 
                                                 
4 This section draws on ArticleII and III of Part II of the thesis. 
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those who elected them (the stockholders) or those who 
depended of on them (the larger public)” (Mizruchi, 2004). 
In line with Berle and Means’ concern that increased corporate and 
managerial power could harm public interests, the early literature and 
definitions of CSR were tied more to society’s interests than to those of 
the firm. As such, CSR built upon moral ideas about the primacy of 
human interests over corporate ones and the desire to mitigate many of 
the negative consequences of corporate power – environmental 
degradation and poisoning, unhealthy products, inhumane workplaces, 
and more (Logsdon and Wood, 2002).  
Selected definitions of CSR5. Bowen’s Social Responsibilities of the 
Businessman (1953) is generally recognised as the book that marks the 
beginning of the academic literature on CSR. His point of departure for 
writing about the social responsibility of business was that the largest 
corporations at that time were vital centres of power and their actions 
affected citizens in many ways (Carroll, 2008). Bowen defined social 
responsibility as “the obligations of businessmen to pursue those 
policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of action that 
are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our society”.  
Writers after Bowen, including Davis (1960; 1967; 1973), Preston and 
Post (1975; 1981) and Carroll (1979), continued to search for an 
appropriate definition of the meaning and content of CSR6. In 1960, 
Davis suggested that corporate responsibility involves decisions and 
actions that transcend the firm’s direct economic interests. Davis later 
                                                 
5 This section largely presents definitions of CSR from the 1960 and 70 as this body 
of literature still provides an important context for the contemporary CSR debate 
(Blowfield and Murray, 2008).  
6 Table 1 provides an overview of selected CSR definitions. 
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(1973) defined CSR as “the firm’s considerations of, and response to, 
issues beyond the narrow economic, technical, and legal requirements 
of the firm (to) accomplish social benefits along with the traditional 
economic gains which the firm seeks.”  
A landmark contribution to the concept of CSR came from the 
Committee for Economic Development (CED) in its 1971 publication 
“Social Responsibilities of Business Corporations.” The CED became 
interested in the topic by observing that business functions by public 
consent and its basic purpose is to serve constructively the needs of 
society (Carroll, 1999). The CED (1971, p. 15) report articulated a 
three concentric circles definition of CSR: The inner circle consisted of 
the basic responsibilities for the efficient execution of the economic 
function – products, jobs and economic growth. The intermediate circle 
in the CED understanding of CSR encompassed the business 
responsibility to exercise the economic function with sensitivity to 
changing social values and priorities: for example, with respect to 
environmental conservation; hiring and relations with employees; and 
more rigorous expectations of customers for information, fair 
treatment, and protection from injury. The outer circle outlined the 
responsibility that business should assume to become more broadly and 
actively engaged in improving the social environment.  
Preston and Post introduced the notion of public responsibility in 1975. 
At the core of this notion lies the idea that business and society are 
mutually dependent systems, and firms should be socially responsible 
by adhering to the standards of performance both in law and in the 
public policy process because they exist and operate in a shared 
environment. According to Preston and Post (1975, 1981) the notion of 
public responsibility expresses the responsibility of businesses for 
outcomes related to their primary and secondary areas of involvement 
with society; meaning that business organisations are not responsible 
for solving all social and environmental problems. Instead, they are 
responsible for solving problems they have caused and for helping to 
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solve problems and issues related to their business operations and 
interests. Together, the primary and secondary responsibilities define 
what Preston and Post (1975, p. 57) call the “legitimate scope of 
corporate responsibility”.  
Carroll (1979) closed in on the notion of CSR by observing that society 
has some basic expectations towards the role and responsibility of 
business. The first obligation of business towards society is economic 
in nature, and refers to the fundamental responsibility of business to 
produce goods and services that society wants, and being profitable. 
The second obligation of business is legal in nature, and refers to the 
responsibility of business to fulfill its core economic activity within the 
laws and regulations that society has laid down. The third obligation of 
business is ethical in nature, and refers to the responsibility of business 
to go beyond legal compliance, as society has expectations to business 
over and above legal requirements. The forth obligation of business is 
discretionary in nature, and refers to the voluntary responsibility of 
business in “doing what is right” even if there are no clear-cut societal 
expectations.  
Given this range of obligations business has to society, Carroll (1979, 
p. 500) thus defined CSR as “the economic, legal, ethical, and 
discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at a given 
point in time.” This conceptualization and definition of CSR is 
probably the most established, accepted and cited one for 
understanding the different aspect of the social responsibility of 
business in society (Crane and Matten, 2004), and it is also the one that 
constitutes the point of departure for the understanding of and the 
inquiry into manifestations CSR in this study.  
Contrary to many contemporary instrumental and duty-aligned CSR 
conceptualizations, Carroll’s (1979) definition go beyond the idea that 
corporate responsibility is purely voluntary (ethical and discretionary) 
by emphasizing the importance of legal mechanisms and frameworks 
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Table 1: Selected definitions of CSR 
Author Definitions of CSR 
Bowen (1953) (CSR) refers to the obligations of businessmen to pursue those 
policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of 
action that are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of 
our society. 
Davis (1973) (CSR is) the firm’s considerations of, and response to, issues 
beyond the narrow economic, technical, and legal requirements 
of the firm (to) accomplish social benefits along with the 
traditional economic gains which the firm seeks. 
Sethi (1975) Social responsibility implies bringing corporate behaviour up to a 
level where it is congruent with the prevailing social norms, 
values, and expectations of performance.  
Carroll (1979) The social responsibility of business encompasses the economic, 
legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of 
organisations at a given point in time. 
Frederick 
(1986) 
The fundamental idea of corporate social responsibility is that 
business corporations have an obligation to work for social 
betterment.   
Marrewijk 
(2003) 
In general, corporate sustainability and, CSR refer to company 
activities – voluntary by definition – demonstrating the inclusion 
of social and environmental concerns in business operations and 
in interactions with stakeholders. 
Waddock 
(2004a) 
Corporate social responsibility is the subset of corporate 
responsibilities that deals with a company’s 
voluntary/discretionary relationships with its societal and 
community stakeholders. 
McWilliams, 
Siegel, and 
Wright (2006) 
CSR (is) situations where the firm goes beyond compliance and 
engages in actions that appear to further some social good, 
beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law. 
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for informing responsible business conduct. The conceptualization also 
goes beyond many instrumental CSR conceptualizations by 
emphasizing that the economic mission and responsibility of business is 
not per see about making a profit for shareholders (e.g., Porter, 2006), 
but more importantly about an obligation to produce goods and services 
that society wants. The locus for defining responsibility is thus not – as 
in instrumental CSR perspectives – corporate objectives and interests, 
but the interests of people and society.    
CSR perspectives. The notion of CSR later evolved into different 
approaches, covering related terms such as social responsiveness (e.g., 
Frederick, 1987), corporate social performance (e.g., Wartick and 
Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991; Wood and Jones, 1995), the stakeholder 
approach (e.g., Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Jones 
and Wicks, 1999), corporate citizenship (Matten and Crane, 2005; 
Moon, Crane, and Matten, 2005; Nèron and Norman, 2008; Wood and 
Logsdon, 2002), the ‘triple bottom line’ approach (Elkington, 1994, 
1997) and corporate sustainability (e.g., Marrewijk, 2003). CSR can 
thus be understood as an umbrella term for economic, social and 
environmental issues (Welford, 2003), wherein the relationship 
between business and society is studied. 
Several typologies and classifications have been suggested to bring 
some order into the business in society literature (e.g. Blowfield and 
Murray, 2008; Carroll, 1999; Frederick, 1987, 1998; Garriga and Melè, 
2004; Melè, 2008; Windsor, 2006). Brummer (1991) suggested that the 
spectrum of approaches to CSR could be ordered as classical, 
stakeholder, social demanding and social activist. 
The classical approach to CSR, which can also be framed as arguments 
against CSR, comes in two variants. Building on classical Parsonian 
pluralism (Parsons, 1951), it could be argued that other institutions in 
society – like political institutions and civil society institutions – exist 
to perform the types of functions required by social responsibility 
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(Jones, 1999). The functional theory argument largely defines CSR 
along the same economic dimension as identified by Friedman and 
Friedman (1962). His property rights argument against CSR above 
what is profitable has its roots in classical capitalism. This perspective 
maintains that managers have no right to act other than to enhance 
shareholder value. To do otherwise constitutes a violation of the 
management’s legal, moral and fiduciary responsibilities. In sum, the 
social obligations of business are confined to satisfying legal and 
economic criteria. 
Contrary to the classical perspective, the stakeholder perspective 
suggests that responsibilities of a business extend beyond shareholders 
to include the company’s stakeholders. In general, stakeholder theory is 
focused on those interests and actors who affect, or in turn are affected 
by, the corporation (Freeman, 1984). Stakeholders can be defined as 
persons or groups with legitimate interests in procedural or substantive 
aspects of corporate activity (Donaldson and Preston, 1995: 67). It is 
their interests in the corporation that identify the stakeholders, whether 
or not the corporation has any corresponding functional interest in 
them. Freeman’s stakeholder theory asserts that managers must satisfy 
a variety of different individuals or groups inside or outside the 
corporation. This could be a ‘primary’ stakeholder like the providers of 
capital, customers, employees and suppliers, but also more ‘secondary’ 
stakeholders like governments, local community organisations, 
indigenous people and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
Stakeholder theory implies that it can be beneficial for the firm to 
engage in certain CSR activities that stakeholders define as important. 
Otherwise, stakeholders might withdraw their support from the firm. 
The social demanding approach holds that corporations are responsible 
to carry out those activities that society (not just stakeholders) demands 
and expects of them. A foundational idea is that, since business 
depends on society for its existence and growth, business should 
integrate social demands and expectations into its activities so that they 
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operate in accordance with the prevailing social values. As such, the 
approach is inherently relativistic: It does not state any specific action 
that corporations and their managers are always responsible to perform. 
The actual content of CSR is dependent both upon time and place, that 
is, what society currently defines as its societal responsibility. 
In contrast to the social demanding approach to CSR, the social activist 
approach to CSR holds that universal standards or values should 
determine corporate and managerial decision-making and action, 
independent of the view of shifting coalitions of stakeholders or 
expectations from society at large. Brummer (1991: 190) summarises 
the social activist approach to CSR in the following way: 
“It (the social activist approach to CSR) holds that executives 
are responsible for pursuing social or moral goals from 
voluntary motives, even when doing so compromises the firm’s 
profit performance (at least in the short term). Corporations or 
their members are required to perform acts that benefit 
shareholders, stakeholders, and the general public, both in the 
primary areas of their business decision making (where the 
direct effects of their actions are more likely to be noticed) and 
in secondary and tertiary areas as well (where the indirect 
effects become more prominent). Last, in considering the 
interests and welfare of others, corporate executives are to 
respond to the formers’ ideal or rational interests rather than 
merely their expressed or current interests.” 
The responsibility assigned to businesses and companies in the 
different approaches to CSR are summarised in Figure 1 (adapted from 
Article II, 2008): 
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Figure 1: Responsibility assigned to business in different CSR perspectives 
 
The arrow pointing towards the right indicates increasing degrees of 
responsibility towards society, from “contractive” to “expansionist” 
notions of responsibility (Article I). “Contractive CSR” refers to a 
notion of CSR in which the responsibility mechanisms is initiated by 
collective-level actors (e.g., the state, tri-partite arrangements), and 
where the collective-level actors usually functions as the prime 
responsibility bearers, but where the corporate entities affiliated with 
the responsibility program become involved in the administration of 
CSR issues close to the core economic functioning of the corporate 
entity. In contrast, “Expansionist CSR” refers to notions of CSR in 
which the corporate entity assumes a responsibility for a potential 
broad range of issues beyond the core economic mission of the firm 
(Article I). The classical approach to CSR falls closest to the base of 
the arrow (‘the only responsibility of business is to make profit’), while 
we find the social activist approach at its point (‘corporate managers as 
moral and social leaders’)7. 
                                                 
7 What I refer to as instrumental and duty-aligned CSR perspectives in many ways cut 
across the approaches outlined by Brummer (1991). Instrumental CSR perspectives is 
most firmly rooted within a classical approach to business in society, where making a 
profit for shareholders constitute the ultimate justification of business responsibility. 
Some stakeholder (e.g., Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, 1997) and social demandingness 
approaches has however also an identifiable instrumental orientation (Scherer and 
Palazzo, 2007). Duty-aligned or ethical CSR perspectives are most firmly rooted 
within the social activist approach to business in society, where ethics and universal 
 
 
          “Contractive CSR”                                             “Expansionist CSR”    
Classical        Stakeholder         Social demandingness        Social activist 
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Having presented a general backdrop from which to frame discussions 
about the role and responsibility of business in society (autonomy and 
control), and some definitions and approaches to CSR, I now turn to an 
outline of the overall theoretical perspective from which I proceed to 
analyse institutional manifestations of CSR, the potential societal level 
implications of CSR manifestations, and the justification of CSR.
                                                                                                                    
norms constitute the ultimate justification for responsible business conduct. Some 
stakeholder (e.g., Freeman, 1984) and social demandingness approaches (Wood, 
1991) has however also an identifiable value orientation (Blowfield and Murray, 
2008; Melè, 2008).    
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3 Theory  
This chapter presents an overall theoretical framework for discussing 
the institutional contingent and embedded nature of CSR, its potential 
political-institutional implications, and for conceptualising CSR as a 
political construct. This theoretical framework is the New 
Institutionalism of political science (e.g.; Hall, 1986; Katzenstein, 
1996; March and Olsen, 1984, 1989, 1996, 2006a, 2006b; Olsen, 1983, 
1988, 2009; Skocpol, 1985, 19928.  
What makes this variant of new institutionalism9 especially relevant for 
analysing a construct like CSR, it that it offers a framework for 
discussing both what variables inform different interpretations and 
manifestations of CSR, and that it builds on normative criteria for 
judging the appropriateness and desirability of organisational behaviour 
and its potential institutional and political implications. As such, the 
new institutionalism of political science unites normative10 political 
theory with descriptive/empirical11-positivist/interpretationist 
                                                 
8 The New Institutionalism is “new” in the sense of constituting an alternative to the 
“old” institutionalism of political science. 
9 Institutional theory comes in several variants, each with its own conception of what 
constitutes ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutional theory (Scott, 2001).  
10 I refer to normative theory as theory that attempts to interpret the function of, and 
offer guidance about the social responsibility of the business firm on the basis of 
some underlying (philosophical and/or political) principles (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995). 
11 I refer to descriptive institutional theory as theory that is used to describe structural-
regulative and normative-cognitive aspects of institutions, and their implications for 
individual preferences and behaviour.   
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organisational theory about how to – through institutional and 
organisational mechanisms and structures – support or sustain specific 
values and interests within the framework of representative 
democracy12.  
The theoretical framework for this thesis thus follows the approach of 
Jones and Wicks (1999) for outlining a convergent perspective, in this 
study, in which the theory – the new institutionalism –combines an 
‘orthodox’ or functionalistic social science approach (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979) that purports to describe and understand manifestations 
of organisational and societal phenomena (empirical/descriptive 
research), with normative inquiries specifying what is and what is not 
the role and responsibility of business in society.  As such, the thesis 
answers a recent call for linking and converging positivist and 
empirical organisational (CSR) research to normative theories (e.g., 
Kochan, Guillen, Hunter, and O’Mahony, 2009; Margolis and Walsh, 
2003; Walsh, Meyer, and Schoonhoven, 2006).  
This chapter proceeds as follows: Next, I briefly present the field of 
institutional theory. I then discuss some limitations of the current 
institutional analysis of CSR. This discussion constitutes the point of 
departure for three institutional accounts: 1) how institutional logics 
can inform contestation and multiple manifestations of CSR within a 
national institutional field, 2) the potential institutional and political 
                                                 
12 It should however already at this stage be noted that the new institutional 
perspective do not come without some highly problematic elements. Peter (1996) 
summarises the theoretical problems of new institutionalism as the paradox of 
constraints (Grafstein, 1992), the absence of a clear definition of the notion of 
institution, the tautology problem, the problem of the capacity of institutional design, 
and, finally, the problem of conceptual stretching and reductionism. I return to some 
of these problems both in chapter 4.3.1 (“Selection of Theoretical Perspective”) and 
chapter 7 (“Limitations”).   
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implications of explicit manifestations of CSR, and 3) the appropriate 
(political) role and responsibility of business in society from an 
institutional point of view.  Finally, the three institutional accounts of 
CSR – embodying both descriptive and normative argument – are 
united into a single analytical model illustrating the main theoretical 
inquiries and assumptions of the thesis.  
3.1 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory comes in different variants or approaches13. 
Campbell (2004) makes a distinction among three versions of 
institutional analysis: rational choice, organizational, and historical 
institutionalism. The New Institutionalism of political science falls 
neither into the category of organisational nor of historical 
institutionalism14. Rather – and  as will be clear from the discussion 
below – it can be described as building on the assumptions of both, 
uniting historical institutionalism’s normative aspirations and its 
assumptions about the importance of structural-regulative institutions 
for understanding  individuals’ perceptions and behaviour, with the 
organisational institutionalism’s assumptions about the importance of 
                                                 
13 Hall and Taylor (1996), Campbell (1997), Peters (1999), Campbell and Pedersen 
(2001), and Scott, 2001) give a detailed overview and analysis of the different 
variants of institutional theory: its historical roots, differences, and similarities.  
14 Scott (2001) and Campbell (2004) categorise the new institutionalism of political 
science as historical institutionalism. Although it certainly – as Scott (2001, p. 26) 
formulates it – hearkens back to the turn-of-the-century institutional scholars who 
devoted themselves to the detailed analysis of regimes and governance mechanisms, 
new institutionalism also builds on assumptions associated with organisational 
institutionalism, e.g. the idea that taken for granted cognitive and normative structures 
constrain and enable actors.   
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normative, cognitive, and symbolic structures for understanding 
behaviour.  
3.2 The Current Institutional Analysis of CSR15 
An increasingly large body of literature argues that we need to pay 
more attention to how institutional mechanisms influence managers’ 
understanding of the social responsibility of business, and whether or 
not corporations act in socially responsible ways (Aguilera, Rupp, 
Williams, and Ganapathi, 2007; Boxenbaum, 2006; Bűhner, Rasheed, 
Rosenstein and Yoshikawa, 1998; Campbell, 2007; Doh and Guay, 
2006; Gjølberg, 2009; Hoffman, 1999, 2001; Jennings and Zandbergen, 
1995; Jones, 1999; Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes, 2003; Walsh, Weber 
and Margolis, 2003; Matten and Moon, 2005, 2008). Looking beyond 
the differences among variants of institutional theory, the importance of 
the literature is that it focuses on how institutional variables constrains 
and enables behaviour and argues that institutions beyond the market 
are often necessary to ensure that corporations are responsible to the 
interest of social actors apart from themselves (Campbell, 2006). An 
organisation’s action – and individual’s understanding of the world and 
choices – is understood not as a result among an unlimited array of 
possibilities, but rather as a result of a narrowly-defined set of 
legitimate alternatives (Scott, 1995). As such, institutional theory asks 
questions about how perceptions and choices are shaped, mediated, and 
channelled by the institutional environment. Focusing on the 
institutional determinants of CSR is important because companies are 
embedded in a broad set of political and economic institutions that 
affect their behaviour (Campbell, Hollingsworth, and Lindberg, 1991; 
Fligstein, 1990, 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Morgan, 2007; Roe, 
                                                 
15 Parts of this section draw on Article I in Part II of the thesis. 
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1991, 1994; Whitley, 1992, 1999, 2002). As argued in chapter 1 of this 
thesis, this is a somewhat neglected insight within the instrumental and 
duty-aligned perspectives on CSR, that too often understand “corporate 
practices, prices, and working conditions as matters of managerial 
discretion rather than an outcome of production networks as economic, 
political, and ideological systems” (Levy, 2008, p. 947). 
Although the current institutional analysis of CSR holds some promise, 
it comes with its own weaknesses and limitations. A first observation is 
that the current institutional analysis of CSR relies on a somewhat one-
dimensional and over-deterministic account of institutional theory that 
only to a limited degree take into account recent developments within 
institutional theory (e.g., Levy and Scully, 2007; Lawrence, Suddaby, 
and Leca, 2009; Lounsbury, 2008; Zilber, 2002). That theory explains 
how to account for heterogeneity, contestation and practice variation, as 
well as homogeneity and consensus within a distinct institutional field. 
Furthermore, through emphasising how a dominant and exclusive 
(Scott, 1994, 2001) institutional logic of the role and responsibility of 
business in society informs consensus around the manifestations of 
CSR within an institutionalised national framework, the literature often 
ignores the very essence of the notion of CSR: managerial discretion or 
agency (e.g., Carroll, 1979; Matten and Moon, 2008; Marrewijk, 2003). 
Much of the current institutional analysis of CSR envisages managers’ 
choices and corporate actions as structurally bounded and highly 
institutionalised, and thus – to borrow a phrase from Meyer and Rowan 
(1977, p. 344) – ‘in some measure beyond the discretion of any 
individual participant or organization’. Differently put, the current 
institutional analysis of CSR very much discharges the essence of the 
notion of explicit CSR itself, that of managerial discretion or agency, 
allowing “each entity, individual or group” some relative freedom to 
act according to its awareness, capabilities and best understanding of its 
situation” (Marrewijk, 2003, p. 98), within some political, economic, 
and cultural bounds. Consequently, the framework also somewhat 
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ignores how actors not only adapt to their institutional context, but also 
often play an active role in shaping those contexts (e.g., DiMaggio, 
1988; Maguire and Hardy, 2006; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Levy and 
Scully, 2007; Lounsbury, 2008). 
A second observation is that the current institutional analysis of CSR 
seems to direct most attention towards the study of the variables that 
inform different manifestations of CSR, and how we can understand 
these manifestations, rather than to the potential outcome of CSR. That 
is, the current institutional analysis very much treats CSR as 
explanandum, rather than as explanans. As such, CSR is treated as a 
dependent variable in need of explanation (e.g. Aguilera, et al., 2007; 
Campbell, 2006, 2007; Matten and Moon, 2005, 2008). Although this is 
highly valuable research, an argument of this thesis is that the 
institutional analysis of CSR should also concern itself with, and make 
inquiries into the potential implications of CSR (e.g., Barley, 2007; 
Walsh, et al., 2006). Rather than treating CSR as an dependent variable 
in need of explanation, such an approach would treat CSR as an 
institutional independent variable with the potential to increase our 
understanding of the institutional and political outcome or implications 
of different manifestations of CSR. Within the study field of CSR – and 
especially within the instrumental tradition – there is a huge body of 
literature that has used CSR as explanans in order to explain corporate 
financial performance (although with very mixed conclusions, e.g. 
Aguilera, et al., 2003; Margolis and Walsh, 2003). CSR is, however, 
not regularly used as explanans in order to make inquiries into its 
potential societal implications. As argued by Matten and Moon (2008) 
‘…it remains, (…) open to future research whether different social 
issues are more effectively and efficiently addressed by explicit than by 
implicit CSR; how the social outcomes reflect fairness, social inclusion, 
and equalities of opportunities…’. The relative lack of research into the 
societal implications of CSR is a paradox; early definitions of CSR 
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were tied more to society’s interests than to those of the firm (e.g. 
Bowen, 1953). 
A third observation is that although institutional theories have 
normative as well as positive ambitions, the current institutional 
analysis of CSR is seldom used for justificatory purposes (Van 
Oosterhout and Heugens, 2008); that is, the theory is not used for 
making inquiry into and discussing the appropriate role and 
responsibility of business in society. Normative considerations have 
mostly been treated as explanans in positivist institutional explanations 
of CSR. Campbell (2007, p. 962) argues for example that   
corporations are more likely to act in socially responsible ways 
the more they encounter strong state regulation, collective 
industrial self-regulation, NGOs and other independent 
organizations that monitor them, and a normative institutional 
environment that encourages socially responsible behavior.  
Such positivist inquiries often constitute a point of departure for, or 
often coexist with, normative arguments about the worth and 
superiority of specific institutional structures for obtaining or 
promoting socially responsible behaviour. Again, Campbell (2007, p. 
963) can serve as a good example of this kind of normative inquiry 
within the institutional analysis of CSR:   
…some suggest that the best way to get firms to behave in 
socially responsible ways is to convince their managers that it is 
either the right thing to do ethically or it is in their self-interest 
(Handy, 2003; Kaku; 2003; Prahalad and Hammond, 2003). 
Appeals such as these may help, but institutions are critical, 
especially if we are concerned with ensuring that corporations 
actually behave in socially responsible ways, rather than just 
pay rhetorical lip service to the issue.      
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Valuable as such normative inquiries is, and contrary to the position of 
Van Oosterhout and Heugens (forthcoming), an argument of this thesis, 
is that institutional theory – or more precisely, the New Institutionalism 
of political science (e.g., March and Olsen, 1984; 1996; Olsen, 2009) – 
also holds some justificatory promise and potential for discussing the 
role and responsibility of business in society.    
A fourth and final observation is that the current institutional theory of 
CSR has yet to suggest a convergent perspective, in which empirical 
and positive analysis is combined with normative judgement about the 
appropriateness of diverse manifestations of CSR and what the role and 
responsibility of business in society should be.  
Given these observations, an important argument of this thesis is that a 
more satisfactory institutional analysis of CSR needs to account for the 
existence not only of multiple and contesting logics (Friedland and 
Alford, 1991; Scott, 1994; 2001) and its embedded institutional 
contradictions (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) existing within an 
institutional field, but also for the role of actors and agency in molding 
the material practices and symbolic constructions that constitute the 
organising principle of a given institutional logic and order. In addition, 
a more satisfactory institutional analysis of CSR should also make 
inquiries into the potential implications of CSR. Rather than treating 
CSR as a dependent variable in need of explanation, such an approach 
would treat CSR as an institutional independent variable with the 
potential to improve our understanding of the institutional and political 
outcome or implications of different manifestations of CSR. Further, 
given the potential societal and institutional impact and implications of 
CSR, the institutional analysis of CSR should also discuss how to 
critically evaluate and judge the appropriateness of companies’ CSR 
efforts, and the role and responsibility of business in society. Finally, 
the descriptive and normative oriented institutional analysis should 
inform each other in a dialectic fashion, and hence comprise a 
convergent institutional perspective on CSR.    
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3.3 The New Institutional Descriptive Argument 
Most fundamentally, the new institutionalism of political science (e.g. 
March and Olsen, 1984, 1996) is a theory – or a collection of ideas16 – 
about the structuring effect of institutions on individuals’ perceptions, 
behaviour, and action, through which mechanisms this influence comes 
about, and about institutional adaptation and change. It thus resemble 
an historical interest in political theory for the ways in which behaviour 
is institutionally contingent and embedded (e.g. Wolin, 1960), limiting 
the room for individual will-calculation, but without excluding the 
possibility for agency. However, the new institutionalism of political 
science is more than this. It can also be understood as a normative 
political theory, directing attention to politics as ‘the interpretation of 
life’ (March and Olsen, 1989, p. 47), and the values and importance of 
political criteria as a foundation for sustaining the political order (e.g. 
Crick, 1962) itself. 
Unlike, or in contrast to, other ‘stories about politics’ (March and 
Olsen, 1994, p. 3) and decision-making, behaviour and action within 
formal normative organisations, structures and rules (e.g. reductionism 
and structuralism), the new institutional perspective of political science 
assumes that political institutions and structures – or formal 
organisations – have an independent and structuring effect on an 
individuals’ view of the world, perceptions, attitudes, decision-making 
and behaviour. Preferences are not only exogenous, but also 
endogenous constructed in which the institutional structures and rules 
individuals find themselves.  
                                                 
16 March and Olsen (1984, 1996) argues that the new institutionalism of political 
science not should be understood as a fully developed and logical consistent theory, 
but rather as a collection of – sometimes inconsistent – ideas about politics, behaviour 
in formal organisations, and the institutional condition for politics. For the purpose of 
this thesis, I will still refer to the new institutionalism of political science as a theory.  
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That means that the institutional perspective questions the view of 
structuralism (dominating the discipline of sociology) that politics and 
individuals’ perceptions and behaviour within formal organisations first 
of all should be understood and explained as reflecting exogenous 
variables like class, social stratification, economy, religion, and 
ideology. That also means that the institutional perspective questions 
the view of reductionism (dominating the disciplines of economics and 
psychology) that politics and decision-making and action within formal 
organisations should be understood and explained as the aggregated 
outcome comprehensible at the individual level. Instead, the new 
institutionalism of political science insists on an independent effect of 
political structures and institutions and formal organisation on 
individuals’ views of the world, the construction of meaning, roles and 
identities, the matching of identities to situations, the activation of rules 
of appropriateness, and behaviour (March and Olsen, 1984, 1996, 
2006a). In short, institutions matter (e.g., Skocpol, 1985; Krasner, 
1991), and inform identities and what March and Olsen (1984) refer to 
as logics of appropriateness, making some interpretations of the world 
and lines of actions more probable or reasonable (and appropriate) than 
others: 
Political institutions are collections of interrelated rules and 
routines that define appropriate action in terms of relations 
between roles and situations. The process involves determining 
what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what the 
obligations of that role in that situation are (March and Olsen, 
1989, p. 160). 
The central idea can be formulated like this: Structural/regulative and 
cognitive/normative (and symbolic) aspects of institutions define and 
institutionalise roles and identities for individuals, who in turn define 
rules of appropriateness informing some interpretations, behaviour and 
lines of action as appropriate, that is, as normal, natural, right, or good, 
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and some interpretations, behaviour and lines of action as appropriate, 
that is, as unnatural, wrong and bad (March and Olsen, 2006a). 
The notion of institution. The new institutionalism of political science 
takes its point of departure from the ‘old’ or historical institutional 
tradition (e.g., Weber, 1946) and of political science. This variant of 
institutionalism assumes that institutions matters in political life and 
that politics could be understood by acquiring knowledge about the 
formal normative organisational structure of political institutions. 
Therefore, the hallmark of this tradition was an insistence on 
descriptive and detailed analysis of political structural-regulative 
institutions, regimes and governance mechanisms. The old 
institutionalism – and indeed political science as a discipline – also had 
a strong normative orientation, in which political institutions were 
understood as the basic condition for the existence of a political order 
(Wolin, 1960).  
The new institutionalism of political science represents a renewed 
interest for these two central elements of the old institutionalism. Most 
importantly, the new institutionalism assumes that the structural-
regulative aspects of political institutions and formal organisations 
make a difference: that individual perceptions and behaviour can partly 
be understood with references to the formal normative organisational 
structure in which they function. 
At the same time, the new institutionalism of political science deviates 
from the historical tradition by building on a much broader notion of 
institution. Institutions are not only structural-regulative formal 
organisations, but also normative, cognitive, and symbolic orders 
(March and Olsen, 1984; Olsen, 1988). 
Formal organisations are more than their explicit structures, 
procedures, routines, budgets, demographic and physical structures and 
the like. From a new institutional perspective, formal organisations can 
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also be understood and studied as normative orders defining interests, 
goals, ideas, and values, informing perceptions and behaviours based 
more on a logic of appropriateness than on a logic of consequences. 
Institutions define for individuals what is and is not appropriate, 
creating behaviour capable of exceeding conceptions of self-interest 
towards (moral) obligations (Olsen, 1988). As a result, ‘political 
behaviour, like other behaviour, can be described in terms of duties, 
obligations, roles and rules’ (March and Olsen, 1984, p. 744).             
Finally, institutions are also cognitive (and symbolic) structures, that is, 
the rules that constitute the nature of reality and the frames through 
which meaning is made (Scott, 1995).  
In sum then, the new institutionalism of political science sees 
institutions as including both ‘formal structures and informal rules and 
procedures that structure conduct’ (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 2). As 
such, new institutionalism draws attention to both the structural-
regulative aspects of institutions (the state, financial system, and the 
like), and the normative and cognitive aspects of institutions (patterns 
of thought and taken-for-granted assumptions informing what is, and 
what is not natural or appropriate in a specific situation) (Tempel and 
Walgenbach, 2007). Given this broad notion of institution, this thesis 
builds on Scott’s (1995, p. 33) definition of institution as consisting of 
‘cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that 
provide stability and meaning to social behaviour’, transported by 
‘various carriers – cultures, structures, and routines’, operating ‘at 
multiple levels of jurisdiction’.  
Institutional effects. The new institutional perspective of political 
science sees politics as an ‘interpretation of life’ (March and Olsen, 
1984, p. 741), thus challenging and opposing the instrumental notion of 
politics as who gets what and how (Lasswell, 1958).  Building on 
Pateman (1970) and Lafferty (1981), politics is ‘regarded as education, 
as a place for discovering, elaborating, and expressing meanings, 
establishing shared (and opposing) conceptions of experience, values, 
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and the nature of experience’ (March and Olsen, 1984, p. 741). Further, 
political institutions do not only represent authority and power, but also 
collective wisdom and ethics, suggesting ‘physical, cognitive, and 
moral frames for action, concepts through which we observe and 
construct reality, rights and duties, perceptions of fairness and symbols 
through which individuals makes identifications’ (Olsen, 1988, p. 32).   
Given these ideas about the ‘political’ and ‘political institutions’, the 
new institutional perspective builds on broad assumptions about the 
effects and potential outcome of institutional life. The interest is not 
primarily directed towards the allocation of scarce resources in the face 
of conflict of interests, but rather and more importantly to how 
established institutions affect individuals’ commitment, belonging, 
understanding, and interpretations (Olsen, 1988), and the condition for 
individual action on the basis of the interests of the political community 
(Arblaster, 1987) and the common good.  
New institutional theory sees the construction of meaning and belief as 
an important aspect of politics, and one which institutional life is 
capable of affecting (Olsen, 1988). Further, institutions shape the 
definition of alternatives and influence the perception and construction 
of the reality within which action takes place (March and Olsen, 1996). 
It is assumed that political institutions – both as structural-regulative 
arrangements, and as cognitive, normative, and symbolic orders – 
affects citizens’ conceptions of self, expectations of life, political 
resources, and activities. Further, it is assumed that political institutions 
influence and affect an individual’s perceptions of the values of 
representative democracy itself; politics, democracy, justice and 
freedom (Olsen, 1988), and thereby also questions of the role of 
political institutions vis-à-vis other spheres of society, the relationship 
between these spheres – e.g. political vs. business – and what interests 
and values the different institutions of society should promote and 
assume responsibility for. Attention is thus directed to the potential 
institutional effect and implications for the political order itself, 
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individuals’ identification with the political community, legitimacy and 
trust (Olsen, 1988). From an institutional point of view, the formal-
regulative aspects of institutions should not only be judged according to 
its economic and technical efficiency, but also upon its impact on the 
conditions for sustaining the political order itself (Crick, 1962) and 
symbolic and cultural aspects (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
The new institutional perspective does not only argue that established 
political institutions and formal organisations have an independent 
effect on individuals’ perceptions and action, but also that the change 
of institutional life is capable of determining change in individuals’ 
interpretation, constructions, and actions (e.g. Egeberg, 1984). Thus, an 
institutional perspective assumes that political institutional reforms and 
adaptation will – over time – inform change in citizens’ perceptions of 
the political order and its own role within it and responsibility for 
sustaining that order.    
Agency. A source of controversy among institutionalists and for 
critique of institutional theory is the role of agency within the 
institutional assumptions and argument (e.g. Lounsbury, 2007, 2008). 
In general, institutional analysis has seen limited room and possibilities 
for agency and individual and organisational level action influencing 
and determining the same institutional framework in which they 
function. To a certain extent, this is also true for the new 
institutionalism of political science, in which institutions are ‘usually 
associated with routinization and repletion, persistence and 
predictability, rather than with political change and flexibility, agency, 
creativity and discretion’ (March and Olsen, 1996, p. 258). At the same 
time, the new institutionalism of political science – as the neo-
institutionalism of sociology (e.g. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991) – does not rule out the possibility for agency and 
institutional change. As argued by March and Olsen (1996, p. 258):  
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Communicable meaning is subject to reinterpretation. 
Institutions change as individuals learn the culture (of fail to), 
forget (parts of) it, revolt against it, modify it or reinterpret it 
(McNeil and Thompson, 1971; Lærgreid and Olsen, 1978, 
1984). The resulting drifts in meaning lead to changes that 
explore alternative political paths and create the divergences of 
politics.  
In that way, and from a cognitive point of view, new institutional 
theory recognises a basis and role for agency within its theoretical 
assumptions. Actors are capable of purposefully acting in their own 
interest, potentially leading both to the maintenance and change of 
institutions (Boxenbaum and Strandgaard Pedersen, 2009; DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991; Scott, 2008). At the same time, they do this within 
socially constructed frames, both constituting and limiting their 
purposeful interpretations and actions (Scott, 1995).    
The view of agency within the new institutional theory is thus more 
balanced than what Lounsbury (2008) refers to as conventional 
interpretations of institutional theory where individuals’ meaning, 
interpretations, and actions are reduced to deterministic institutional 
conditions. Institutions matter, but are at the same time maintained, 
reinterpreted, and changed by actors following their own interests. 
Olsen (1988) refer to the view of the actor within new institutional 
theory as ‘the political human’, being an actor capable of following its 
own interests, values and point of views, but within a frame of 
distinctive institutional norms and rules. 
Moving from the general new institutional argument about the 
structuring and probabilistic effects of institutions upon individuals’ 
worldview, interpretations, sense-making, decisions, and ultimately 
lines of action, this section picks up on the observation of the current 
institutional analysis of CSR as often one-dimensional and over-
deterministic, and develops an institutional argument of heterogeneity, 
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contestation, and practice variation. It is argued that the co-existence of 
conflicting institutional logics within a national field holds the 
possibility of informing agency and hence very different interpretations 
of the notion of explicit CSR within that field.  
3.3.1 Manifestations of CSR within National 
Institutional Fields17 
Early neo-institutional theory has often emphasised homogeneity and 
the development of consensus around institutional phenomena within 
institutional fields (e.g., Jennings and Zandbergen, 1995). More recent 
analysis (e.g., Lounsbury, 2007), however, has begun to show how 
heterogeneity, practice variation, and contestation can materialise in the 
context of a pluralistic environment that promulgate not only multiple, 
but also possibly contradictory, rationalised myths of reality (e.g., 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
The materialisation of the notion of institutional logic has been a 
turning point in the redirection of institutional analysis away from the 
study of homogeneity toward heterogeneity and practice variation 
(Lounsbury, 2008). That notion, which refers to a set of material 
practices and symbolic constructions constituting an institutional 
order’s organising principles (Friedland and Alford, 1991), can be 
defined as ‘the socially constructed, historical pattern of material 
practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals 
produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organise time and 
space, and provide meaning to their reality’ (Thornton, 2004, p. 69). 
Institutional logics shape both the individual and collective 
understandings of what conditions are problematic and the practices 
                                                 
17 This section draws on Article I in Part II of the thesis. 
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that represent appropriate solutions to these problems (Green, Li, and 
Nohria, 2009).     
Institutional fields differ in the exclusiveness (Scott, 1994) enjoyed by 
their logics. Some fields may indeed be characterised by one central, 
relatively coherent set of beliefs. Other fields, however, will contain 
secondary logics that compete for adherents or – as emphasised in this 
study – they will contain multiple, contradictory and conflicting belief 
systems and material practice. Pluralistic political systems tend in 
general to be characterised by multiple and contentious institutional 
logics, rather than by dominant exclusive ones (Scott, 2001). This 
insight is important, as it constitutes a point of departure for explaining 
how multiple forms of rationality may exist within a national-level 
institutional field (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), and, as such, it provides a 
foundation for the explanation of heterogeneity and practice variation 
within that field (Lounsbury, 2008). 
Within this theoretical thesis, actors – as individuals and organisations 
– do not passively adapt to the logics and scripts embedded in the 
institutional field. Rather, multiple logics provide an institutional 
foundation (Lounsbury, 2008), which enables actors to advance 
competing claims and diverse courses of action as they engage in 
continued processes of sense-making and interpretation. In other words, 
multiple logics provide a foundation for agency and institutional 
entrepreneurship as actors draw upon different logics in their ongoing 
struggles for appropriate and non-appropriate interpretations of reality 
(Maguire and Hardy, 2006).  
The co-existence of multiple logics and institutional contradictions thus 
brings questions of interest, power, and agency into institutional 
analysis, key phenomena within the emerging and rapidly growing 
body of literature on institutional entrepreneurship (e.g., DiMaggio, 
1988; Friedland and Alford, 1991; Lounsbury, 2008; Maguire and 
Hardy 2006; Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence, 2004; Selznick, 1957; 
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Zilber, 2002; Zucker, 1987). Perhaps the key question addressed by the 
literature on institutional entrepreneurship is how actors – being 
embedded in an institutionalised field characterised by rationalised 
myths that is ‘in some measure beyond the discretion of any individual 
participant or organisation’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, 344) – are 
capable of imagining new interpretations of reality and practices 
(Hardy and Maguire, 2008). The position taken in this paper is that 
imagination, acts of interpretation, and the enabling of actors are made 
possible through field conditions characterised by the existence of 
multiple and contesting institutional logics (e.g., Clemens and Cook, 
1999).   
Drawing on social constructionist assumptions (Berger and Luckmann, 
1967) emphasising translation (Latour, 1986) at the micro-level 
(Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996), rather than diffusion of institutional 
phenomena, this study sees institutions as formed and changed as 
meaning comes to be shared and taken for granted. Actors are not only 
carriers of institutional meaning (Zilber, 2002), but are also active 
interpreters, “formulating, conforming to, disobeying, and modifying” 
(Scott, 1994, p. 60) institutional phenomena in their efforts to make 
sense out of the world (Weick, 1995). In this respect, actors’ 
‘sensemaking’, imagination and acts of interpretation of institutional 
phenomena – that is, the attribution of meanings to structures and 
practices (Zilber, 2002) – can be understood as an important form of 
institutional agency (e.g., Hajer, 1995; Maguire and Hardy, 2006; 
Munir, 2005; Zilber, 2002, 2006), in which actors play a role in both 
shaping and being shaped by their institutional environment.      
Building on the theoretical thesis developed above, the assumption of 
homogeneity and consensus around manifestations of CSR within a 
national institutional framework can be questioned and challenged by 
an assumption of heterogeneity and contestation upon the manifestation 
of explicit CSR within a national institutionalised framework. If it can 
be assumed – as I do in this study – that both the logics of the liberal 
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and coordinated markets are embedded in institutional fields at the 
national level, then both explicit and implicit manifestations of CSR 
will be evident within a specific national framework, as well as hybrid 
combinations of the two, as actors invoke the institutional logics and 
their embedded contradictions in order to make sense of the role and 
responsibility of business in society.  
Research question 1. Based on the discussion above, the following 
research question can be formulated: How can institutional theory 
contribute to our understanding of the institutional contingent nature of 
CSR and different manifestations of CSR within national-level fields?    
3.3.2 The Potential Political and Institutional 
Implications of CSR 
This section picks up on the observation of the current institutional 
analysis of CSR as directing far more attention to the study of what 
(institutional) variables that inform manifestations of CSR, than to the 
study of the potential institutional effects of CSR. In contrast to the first 
descriptive institutional account of CSR in this thesis – asking what 
informs manifestations of CSR – the second descriptive institutional 
account of CSR essentially asks what can be explained from CSR, or 
how organisations and explicit manifestations of CSR shape their 
environment. The point of departure for discussing the potential 
societal impact of CSR – that is, putting the organisation and CSR at 
the left hand side of the independent-dependent variable relationship – 
is that CSR not only can be studied as a dependent variable in need of 
explanation, but that CSR can be understood as an aspect of the 
institutional frames and a specific model of societal governance (e.g., 
Moon, 2005), that is, the system which “provide direction to society” 
(Peters, 1997, pp. 51-52).  
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The interest in studying organisations’ impact on questions of human 
welfare peaked around 1980 (Walsh, Weber and Margolis, 2003). In 
the period after, questions of human welfare and the impact of 
organisations of society have mostly been implicit in the instrumental 
CSR approaches that are concerned with establishing a positive 
relationship between corporate social and financial performance. As 
such, concerns for societal development and human welfare have been 
conducted within an economic logic that is mainly concerned with 
organisational efficiency, effectiveness, and economic performance 
(Walsh, Meyer, and Schoonhoven, 2006). Barley (2007), Perrow (1991, 
2000) and Walsh et al., (2006) have all argued that organisation 
theorists – because of the power and reach of modern organisations – 
need to see the organisation as an independent variable and society as 
an dependent variable in their work. Hinings and Greenwood (2002) 
and Margolis and Walsh (2003) have argued in a similar way.    
The concrete manifestations of CSR within institutional fields are of 
course an empirical question. There are good reasons to believe that 
most pluralist democracies will be characterised by hybrid 
manifestations of CSR (e.g., Boxenbaum, 2006), in which multiple 
models of CSR are mixed together depending on how actors invoke 
multiple institutional logics in order to make sense of and translate 
notions of CSR.  However, for the discussion of the potential societal 
implications of CSR, I assume and delimit the inquiry and discussion to 
an explicit manifestation of CSR.  
The notion of explicit CSR can best be accounted for by discussing it in 
terms of its institutional informed antonym: implicit CSR. Building on 
the varieties of capitalism literature (e.g., Hall and Soskice, 2001) and 
the national business system (NBS) approach (e.g., Whitley, 1992, 
1999, 2002), Matten and Moon (2005, 2008) have argued that the 
specific manifestation of CSR within a national context can be 
understood and accounted for with reference to the specific institutional 
logics dominating a country’s historically-grown institutional 
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framework. The argument is that national institutionalised 
environments characterised by the logic of the liberal market will, in 
general, leave clear incentives and opportunities for business to take an 
explicit responsibility for various social issues; that is, 
… corporate policies that assume and articulate responsibility for 
some societal interests. They normally consist of voluntary 
programs and strategies by corporations that combine social and 
business value and address issues perceived as being part of the 
social responsibility of the company (Matten and Moon, 2008, p. 
409).   
National institutional environments characterised by the logic of the 
coordinated market, on the other hand, will – compared to liberal 
market economies – leave fewer incentives and opportunities for 
business to assume a direct, explicit responsibility for social issues. 
Rather, companies’ responsibility for social issues has been implicit, 
referring to  
…a corporations’ role within the wider formal and informal 
institutions for society’s interests and concerns. Implicit CSR 
normally consists of values, norms, and rules that result in 
(mandatory and customary) requirements for corporations to 
address stakeholder issues that define proper obligations of 
corporate actors in collective rather than individual terms. (Matten 
and Moon, 2008, p. 409)     
The question then becomes, what would the different, institutionally-
informed manifestations of CSR look like; what comprises explicit and 
implicit manifestations of CSR? A weakness with the dual construct of 
explicit-implicit CSR is that explicit CSR is defined in terms of 
corporate properties (‘corporate policies that assume and articulate 
responsibility for some societal interest…’), but implicit CSR is 
defined more in terms of some institutional properties (‘Implicit CSR 
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normally consists of values, norms, and rules that result in (…) 
requirements for corporations to address stakeholder issues…’). While 
the definition of explicit CSR as ‘corporate policies’ has an intuitive 
validity in the context of established definitions of CSR as involving 
the ‘Principle of Self-Determination’ (Marrewijk, 2003) or managerial 
discretion (Carroll, 1979), the definition of the dualistic opposite to 
explicit CSR falls short of identifying the notion’s corporate properties. 
Drawing on Matten and Moon (2005, 2008) and based on the logics of 
the models of the liberal and coordinated markets, I suggest that the 
explicit and implicit models of CSR differ in two respects: 1) in the 
basic responsibility mechanisms to address social issues, and 2) in the 
range or scope of issues to which the corporate entity is expected to 
attend (Article I).  
The models of the liberal and coordinated markets differ considerably 
in how what is valued should be addressed and governed. That is, the 
logic differs in the level at which to locate agency and how to construct 
governance structures (Dobbin, 1994). Where the logic of collective 
responsibility embedded in the model of the coordinated market in 
general prescribes rulemaking and rule following as the appropriate 
strategy, and hence defines a role for obligatory agency and associated 
actors, the logic of corporate responsibility embedded in the model of 
the liberal market in general envisages a greater role for isolated 
corporate initiatives and discretionary agency to address such issues. 
As a result, within the model of explicit CSR, the responsibility 
mechanisms are more corporate than collective: the corporate entity – 
through voluntary corporate policies and programmes – assumes a 
direct organisational-level responsibility for various social issues. 
Within the model of implicit CSR, on the other hand, the responsibility 
mechanisms for obtaining what is valued are more collective than 
corporate: the corporate entity, as a member of the societal institution 
of business – through values, norms and rules – assumes an indirect 
responsibility for various social issues, together with the other major 
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institutions of society. Moreover, the enterprise does not enjoy the 
same degree of status as a model for organising societal affairs (e.g., 
Byrkjeflot, 2001; Røvik, 1998) as it does within the model of the liberal 
market. The key difference between corporate- and collective-level 
responsibility mechanisms is that while the former are situated inside 
an organisation and are issued with the authority that managers are 
granted within formal organisations, the latter are situated outside 
organisations and are issued without the authority that managers are 
granted within formal organisations18.  
While the models of the liberal and coordinated market evidently differ 
in how they address and govern what is valued, the logics of the liberal 
and coordinated market models share some basic assumptions about 
what is valued, having similar commitments to democracy, capitalism, 
and welfare (Matten and Moon, 2008). The similarities in what is 
valued do not, however, transcend to the corporate level in terms of the 
scope of issues for which the corporate entity is expected to assume a 
responsibility. Within the model of the liberal market, incentives and 
opportunities are left to the corporate entity in assuming a direct 
responsibility for contributing to obtain what is valued: democracy, 
capitalism and welfare. Consequently, explicit CSR is associated with a 
potentially broad range of social issues. For example, Vogel (1992, p. 
42) showed how businesses have played a significant role in the 
development of U.S. cities and communities and, therefore, have been 
assigned ‘substantial responsibility for the moral and physical character 
of the communities in which they have invested’. It becomes legitimate 
for the corporate entity – more or less decoupled from other societal 
actors – to expound the needs of society and to develop strategies and 
                                                 
18 This distinction draws on the discussion by Ahrne and Brunsson (2004) about the 
nature of voluntary standards.  
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measures that can contribute to realising what is valued, that is, the 
corporate interpretation of democracy, capitalism and welfare.  
Within the model of the coordinated market, on the other hand, the 
corporate entity has far less discretion in expounding the needs of 
society and in developing strategies that will contribute to realising 
those needs; such acts are more the result of collective institutional 
level efforts. As a result, the corporate entity – within the model of 
implicit CSR – will address a narrower range of social issues. For 
example, due to the role of the state in Europe in providing social 
welfare (Clough, 1960; Grahl and Teague, 1997), social responsibility 
has been defined very narrowly and has been constrained mainly to 
offering good working conditions (Weaver, 2001). Byrkjeflot (2001) 
notes that for the coordinated market economies of Scandinavia, there 
has been little tradition for (or acceptance of) businesses and managers 
themselves establishing a vision for society beyond the core economic 
activity of the firm. 
To summarise the argument so far, while the logic of the liberal market 
in general will inform a manifestation of CSR in which the corporate 
entity assumes organisational-level responsibility mechanisms for a 
potentially broad range of social issues, the logic of the coordinated 
market in general will inform a manifestation of CSR in which the 
corporate entity enters into collective-level responsibility mechanisms 
for which it assumes responsibility, or a role in, the administration and 
managing of a narrow range of social issues, for which collective-level 
actors, e.g., the state, industry associations, and tripartite-structures, 
have the prime responsibility.    
There are clear indications of explicit manifestations of CSR beyond 
the U.S. societal and institutional context of which the concept evolved 
in the 1950s. The edited collections of case studies by Habisch, Jonker, 
Wegner, and Schmidpeter (2005) illustrate how explicit notions of CSR 
have spread to all parts of the European continent (including Russia and 
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Turkey). In an empirical comparative study, Gjølberg (2009) found 
evidence of explicit CSR manifestations in 17 European countries, as 
well as in the U.S., Canada, Japan and Australia. The traditional 
coordinated market economies of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and 
Denmark, together with the more liberal market economies of the UK 
Switzerland, and the Netherlands ranked at the top of indexes 
measuring explicit CSR performance. Outside the European context, 
there is – as argued by Matten and Moon (2008) – evidence of a rise in 
explicit manifestations of CSR in Africa (e.g., Visser et al., 2005), Asia 
(e.g. Birch and Moon, 2004), and Latin America (e.g., Puppim de 
Oliveira and Vargas, 2005).     
In sum, we clearly need a better understanding of the possible impact of 
manifestations of CSR, its possible contributions to sustaining and 
developing an appropriate societal order, and, not least, of the possible 
unintended implications of organisational activity and manifestations of 
CSR on human welfare. A central argument of this thesis is that an 
institutional analysis of CSR is open for such inquiries, and leads us to 
ask different questions and undertake some inquiries other than those of 
the instrumental and duty-aligned perspectives on the role and 
responsibility of business in society. The second research question of 
this thesis can be formulated:      
Research question 2. What are the potential institutional and political 
implications of explicit manifestations of CSR? 
3.4 The New Institutional Normative Argument 
While March and Olsen (1984, 1989, 1996) perhaps most importantly 
argued for the importance of organisational and institutional factors for 
understanding behaviour and politics (the new institutional descriptive 
argument), they also stressed the importance of norms and values in 
defining not only how those organisations not only would, but also 
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should function (Peters, 1996) (the new institutional normative 
argument). 
From a new institutional descriptive point of view, it can be assumed 
that institutions will determine specific institutional contingent 
manifestations of CSR, manifestations also having the potential to 
influence the very same institutional factors that had informed it in the 
first place. From an institutional normative point of view, the question 
is how we ought to judge and evaluate manifestations of CSR, and 
ultimately what is and is not the appropriate social role and 
responsibility of business. Based on the normative orientation and 
assumptions of the new institutional theory of political science (March 
and Olsen, 1984, 1996), in this section, I outline some possible criteria 
and values that contribute to answering such a normative question.   
Building on the old institutionalism of political science (e.g. Wilson, 
1889; Burgess, 1902 and Willoughby, 1896, 1904), the new 
institutionalism represents a renewed interest in bringing normative 
political theory into institutional analysis. One of the hallmarks of the 
old institutionalism was studies of with moral philosophy, and scholars 
devoted much attention to the explication of normative principles 
(Scott, 1995) supporting the formal structural-regulative institutions of 
political life.  
By the mid-19th century, the old institutionalism – with its strong 
orientation towards moral philosophy and assumptions about the 
structuring effect of formal organisations on individual behaviour – was 
largely supplanted by the behaviouralist approach (March and Olsen, 
1984; Olsen 1988). Instead of explaining behaviour with reference to 
the formal normative organisational structure of institutions, attention 
shifted to structural and individual level variables, and the ties to moral 
philosophy were broken. In addition, as argued by Scott (1995) the 
notion of the political was reduced to instrumentalist conceptions of 
“Who Gets What, When, and How?” (Laswell, 1958).   
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The new institutionalism of political science can be portrayed as a 
reaction to the ‘behaviouralist revolution’, taking ‘the (normative) 
vision of a political order based upon institutions’ (Wolin, 1960) as its 
point of departure for studies analysing institutional level variables – as 
normative frameworks and rule systems – influence on individuals’ 
perceptions and behaviour. The position taken is that political 
democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions, but 
also on the design of political institutions (March and Olsen, 1984, p. 
738).  
An institution is understood as ‘being infused with values beyond its 
technical requirements’ (Selznick, 1949), and embedding ethical 
principles about the common good. These values in turn, are assumed 
to influence an individual’s worldviews, perceptions and behaviour.  
New institutional theory sees the pursuit of the common good less as a 
personal value than as a constitutive part of democratic political 
identities and the construction of a meaningful person. The political 
order and community are created and sustained by their institutions and 
their rules, not by their intentions (March and Olsen, 1996); that is, the 
political order is institutionally contingent. Problems of contemporary 
society and democracy are thus understood as residing in the structure 
of political rules, institutions and identities, rather than – as assumed 
within reductionism – in individual-level value premises. As such, the 
new institutionalism of political science sees the pursuit of the common 
good as a question of building the right institutions and institutional 
embeddedness of morality, rather than as an effort to build a personal 
set of communitarian values and moral individualism:   
Many of the greatest dangers to the democratic polity come not 
from particularistic individual self-seeking but from deep, group 
based identities that are inconsistent with democracy. Efforts to 
build a personal set of communitarian values enhancing concern 
for the common good will be of little use – even if successful – 
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if anti-democratic actions stems primarily not from preferences 
and their associated values but from commitments to identities 
that is inconsistent with democratic institutions (March and 
Olsen, 1994, p. 13-14).    
From an institutional point of view, a central challenge is to examine 
the implications of specific institutional arrangements and rules on 
individual perceptions and behaviour, and their potential influence on 
the institutional condition for sustaining the political institutional 
condition for the political order itself.   
Having presented aspects of the normative orientation of the new 
institutional perspective, the next section continues the observation that 
the current institutional analysis of CSR is seldom used for justificatory 
purposes, and develops an argument about the possibilities of using 
institutional theory for judging the appropriateness of companies’ 
efforts on the societal arena, and about what the institutional and 
political responsibility of business in society should be. 
3.4.1 Institutional Theory and CSR: A Normative 
Inquiry  
Organisational theories have often been decoupled from normative 
discussions about the values and norms that different organisational 
configurations ought to promote (e.g., Walsh et al., 2006)19. The new 
institutionalism of political science represents a renewed attention to 
the normative criteria by which to judge and evaluate institutionally 
contingent behaviour. Building on the new institutionalism of political 
science and its assumptions derived from normative political theory 
                                                 
19 But see Hatch and Cunliffe (2006) for an overview of some exceptions from this 
observation.    
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(e.g., Wolin, 1960, 2004), this section introduces and outlines some 
possible criteria for judging the appropriateness of companies’ CSR 
efforts in the societal arena, and for contributing to conceptualising 
CSR as a political construct, and the hence for discussing the political 
responsibility of the business firm.  
Within theories of liberal democracy and instrumental or economic 
approach to CSR (e.g., Friedman and Friedman, 1962; Friedman, 1970; 
Jensen, 2001; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the corporate entity is 
reduced to an economic actor, fulfilling its role in society through profit 
maximisation within the legal framework and moral custom of a 
society. Many of the ethical approaches to CSR do not – because of 
their distinction between management theory and moral philosophy – 
transcend the liberal assumption of the corporation as only an economic 
actor in society. As such, both instrumental and ethical CSR 
approaches normally lack a critical analysis of the underlying concept 
of society and its institutions (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007), and 
understand and conceptualise the corporate entity as an apolitical actor. 
As a result, corporate irresponsibility and a general lack of commitment 
to integration of broader economic, social, and environmental values 
into its decision-making and activities for the majority of firms, is to a 
large extent understood as a problem lying primarily in the premises of 
individual preference-based action. Such an analysis leads to 
discussions about constructing win-win scenarios based on voluntary 
exchange, competitive markets, and private contracts, and how to build 
a personal set of values enhancing or promoting ethical sensitivity and 
concern for the detrimental direct and indirect effects of business 
activity.  
From a new institutional perspective, the notion of the corporate entity 
as an apolitical actor, can be questioned and challenged. A new 
institutionalism position itself is somewhere between a liberal and a 
communitarian model of politics (e.g., March and Olsen, 1989). 
Politics and the political order are not – as in the liberal model – based 
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solely on exchange among calculating, self-interested actors. Nor is the 
political order – as in the communitarian model of politics – based on 
shared values and worldviews in a community of common culture. 
Rather, it is assumed that the political order is institutionally 
contingent: political institutions make a difference in political life by 
affecting individuals’ worldviews, perceptions, ideas and preferences. 
From the new institutional point of view, irresponsible business 
behaviour should not be analysed as a problem with the premises of 
individual preference-based action and self-seeking managers, but 
rather as a problem arising from institutionally contingent identities that 
are inconsistent with business behaviour assuming a responsibility for 
issues beyond the interests of the firm and what is required by the law. 
Institutions thus have a value of their own, constituting a source for the 
political order to exist (Wolin, 1960, 2004), for a functioning 
democracy (Dahl, 1982), and societal development.   
The new institutionalism of political science can probably not deliver a 
full blown or all-encompassing theory of the role and responsibility of 
business in society. However, what the theory does is open the door to 
discussions about the values upon which to judge and evaluate the 
efforts of businesses on the societal arena (including corporate political 
activities), the political and institutional conditions for responsible 
business conduct, and for discussing what the (political) responsibility 
of business in society. An institutional perspective thus begs questions 
like: Do companies’ efforts on the societal arena support or undermine 
the institutions constituting the very foundation of a political order 
(e.g., Barley, 2007)? How can the values and norms that society wants 
for business to support or live by be built into the political institutions 
of society (e.g., Campbell, 2007)? What are the political role and 
responsibility of business in society within the context of representative 
democracy (e.g., Hsieh, 2009)? 
Research question 3. Based on the discussion above, the following 
research question can be formulated: How can institutional theory 
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contribute to discussions of a justified foundation for companies’ 
efforts in the societal arena?  
3.5 Analytical Model  
This research can be seen as a response to the recent appeal within the 
study field of CSR (Jones and Wicks, 1999; Kochan, Guillen, Hunter, 
and O’Mahony; Margolis and Walsh, 2003,) for theories integrating 
descriptive-empirical and normative analysis. On the one hand, 
organisational theory and the positivist tradition of CSR (e.g. 
Campbell, 2007) have been relatively decoupled from normative 
analysis about what constitutes the social responsibility of the business 
entity. On the other hand, the post-positivist (e.g. Scherer and Palazzo, 
2007) or normative tradition within the study field of CSR has been 
relatively decoupled from descriptive analysis of the variables that 
constrain or enable organisations to behave responsibly. The new 
institutionalism of political science represents a theoretical framework 
that makes it possible to address and discuss both these traditions, and 
thus the possibility for a convergent (Jones and Wicks, 1999) 
institutional perspective of the role and responsibility of business in 
society.   
 
First of all, such a perspective – or sketch of ideas – would have to 
address the institutionally contingent nature of CSR: the institutional 
variables that inform, constrain, and enable responsible behaviour. 
Second, it would have to address the potential implications of 
institutionally contingent manifestations of CSR on the very same 
institutional conditions that informed it in the first place. Third, it 
would have to address some normative criteria by which to judge 
appropriate and inappropriate manifestations of CSR, thus answering 
the question of the role and responsibility of business in society. In sum 
then, a convergent institutional theory of CSR would be able to probe 
1) what CSR is and what it is it to achieve, and 2) through which 
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institutional variables it is possible to support specific normative 
ambitions. As such, a convergent institutional theory of CSR would be 
able to address what Jones (1983, p. 560) described as the central focus 
of the business and society field: the social control of business, defined 
as ‘the means by which society directs business activity to useful ends’. 
The central aspects of this sketch of a theoretical framework are 
depicted in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Sketch of a convergent institutional theory of CSR 
 
3.6 Summary of Research Questions 
Given the theoretical arguments developed above, this thesis addresses 
the following research questions:  
1. How can institutional theory contribute to our understanding of the 
institutionally contingent nature of CSR and different 
manifestations of CSR within national-level fields?    
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2. What are the potential institutional and political implications of 
explicit manifestations of CSR? 
 
3. How can institutional theory contribute to discussions of a justified 
foundation for companies’ efforts in the societal arena?  
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4 Methodology  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes and discusses the epistemological and 
theoretical orientation and perspectives of this study, and its 
methodology and methods of application. The chapter starts with a 
description of two main epistemological orientations of research 
conducted within the field of Business and Society: positivist and post-
positivist CSR (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007, 2008). This orientation is 
followed by an outline and discussion of the social constructivist and 
critical inquiry oriented perspectives that inform the epistemology and 
theoretical perspectives of this thesis. Then, I present the research 
design of this thesis, including selection of theoretical perspective, data 
production and construction, and analysis and interpretation. Finally, I 
reflect on the trustworthiness of the study. 
4.2 Some Epistemological and Theoretical 
Considerations 
The research on CSR can be categorised into two broad 
epistemological orientations (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007): positivist and 
post-positivist20. The positivist CSR tradition embeds a paradigm that – 
through empirically descriptive oriented research – tries to uncover 
“what is” and “why” “what is” is so, and with what implications. 
Where the positivist CSR tradition largely ignores philosophy and 
                                                 
20 What I earlier has referred to as instrumental and duty-aligned/ethical CSR 
perspectives can most often be classified respectively as positivist and post-positivist 
notions of CSR.      
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argues in favour of a strict distinction between values (non-science) and 
facts (science), post-positive CSR inquires into different normative 
foundations for CSR, a tradition characterised by a critical view of 
positivist theory building. Rather than engaging in a descriptive 
analysis of “what is” and how we can understand or even explain some 
observable social phenomenon, post-positivist CSR can be 
characterised as embracing a ‘social philosophy unencumbered by 
empirical moorings’.21 Based on one or the other philosophy or ethical 
perspective (e.g., the notion of sustainable development, the common 
good, citizenship, social contract theory), post-positivist CSR concerns 
itself with moral evaluation, judgement and prescription (Swanson, 
1999; Weaver and Trevino, 1994): What is CSR? Do companies 
respond appropriately to ethical dilemmas? How should managers and 
firms respond to social misery? Scherer and Palazzo (2007) identify 
monological and discursive CSR as two variants of post-positive CSR. 
Monological CSR refers to normative justifications of CSR that derive 
moral judgements from the cognitive operations of a single actor who 
‘reflects on the consequences of alternative decisions in a given ethical 
dilemma’ (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007, p. 1097). In contrast, discursive 
post-positive CSR starts from the assumption that – in pluralistic 
societies – a justification of the role and responsibility of business in 
society should be found through joint communicative processes among 
multiple actors, of which the business firm itself constitutes one key 
actor (e.g., Article III). What Scherer and Palazzo (2007) refer to as 
discursive post-positivist CSR often share a theoretical perspective of 
critical inquiry through identifying the power and politics of CSR and 
through postulating alternatives to the dominant neo-liberal theory of 
the firm. At the same time, critical oriented CSR perspectives differ in 
the possibility and/or importance they ascribe to identifying and 
                                                 
21 The quote is from Wolin’s (1992, p. 60) reflection on the orientations of Adorno’s 
research in the Frankfurt School.    
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applying ethical criteria or some philosophical stance for justifying the 
role and responsibility of business in society. While some perspectives 
are sceptical about identifying ethical criteria’s from which to justify 
CSR, others are more optimistic in that respect. 
The overall aim, research questions and inquiry of this thesis has been 
informed by the epistemology and theoretical perspective of, 
respectively, constructionism (epistemology) and critical inquiry 
(theoretical perspectives)22. Constructionism is the view that: 
‘…knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is 
contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of 
interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and 
transmitted within an essentially social context’ (Crotty, 2003, p. 42). 
The social constructivism of this thesis manifests itself in two very 
different, but still logically consistent ways. First, the new institutional 
perspective framing and informing the analysis of the study is a social 
constructivist one. At one level, social constructivism refers to the 
stance within which all meaningful reality is understood as socially 
constructed. Second, the methodology of data production and abductive 
line of reasoning can be understood as a social constructivist one. At 
another level, social constructivism refers to the mode of inquiry 
underlying the critically informed construction of arguments and sub-
plots supporting the plot of the study informed by the social 
constructivist perspective of the new institutionalism.                
Building on the critical tradition and orientation of the Frankfurt 
School, the inquiry of this thesis has been directed by the ambition and 
aim of contributing to the integration of normative-philosophical and 
                                                 
22 Epistemology is the ‘the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical 
perspective and thereby in the research methodology’. Theoretical perspective here is 
‘the philosophical stance informing the methodology and thus providing a context for 
the process and grounding its logic and criteria’ (Crotty, 2003, p. 3).   
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empirical CSR research. As such, the interest has not merely 
empirically documented some social phenomenon (as positivist CSR), 
or delved into normative and philosophical constructs (as post-positive 
CSR), but rather contributed to a convergent perspective (e.g., Jones 
and Wicks, 1999; Keating, 2009; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Weaver 
and Trevino, 1994; Walsh, et al., 2006) that inhabits a normative 
orientation that guides empirical research, whose outcome can be 
judged according to the perspective’s normative orientation. In other 
words, the interest has been to develop a perspective in which 
normative and philosophical considerations and empirical research can 
inform each other in a dialectical fashion. It is precisely in the 
combination of normative and empirical work that the social sciences 
may have the most to offer (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Van Langenhoven, 2007). 
The combination of normative and empirical theory is described by 
Baubök (2008) as one of the most promising developments in modern 
political science, harking back to the classical period before the 
splitting of the social sciences into different sub-disciplines.        
In some sense, all social sciences build on some normative assumptions 
that serve as a starting point for theory building (Etzioni, 1990; Merton, 
1973). Within the fields of management research – in which much of 
the current research of CSR is conducted (De Bakker, Groenewegen, 
and Den Hond, 2005; Lockett, Moon, and Visser, 2006) – these 
assumptions are, however, seldom made explicit (Kochan, Guillen, 
Hunter, and O’Mahony, 2009). What Kochan et al. (2009, p. 1098) 
suggest, is that authors should be clear ‘in their heads, in their research, 
and in their involvement in policy debates, about the normative 
perspectives underlying their work’. For the inquiry undertaken in this 
thesis, that does not however imply that I, as a researcher, with any 
necessity, should devote space to illuminate my own values and 
orientations, but that the normative underpinnings of the theoretical 
perspective used as an overall framework for the inquiry of my work – 
the new institutionalism of political science (e.g., Olsen, 2009) – is 
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made explicit. In making these assumptions explicit, however, my own 
normative orientation is implicit simply because I probably would not 
have chosen the new institutional perspective having not believed in the 
vision of a political order based upon institutions (Wolin, 1960, 2004).      
A hallmark of the critical form of inquiry is that it informs research in 
which some dominant ideology – in this case, the idea of explicit CSR 
as furthering the common good – is called into question and 
interrogated. According to Kincheloe and McLaren (1994), critical 
inquiry builds on the assumptions that 
 all thought is mediated by power relations that are social and 
historically constituted 
 facts can never be isolated from the domain of values or removed 
from ideological inscription 
 the relationship between concepts and object, and between signifier 
and signified, is never stable and is often mediated by the social 
relations of capitalist production and consumption 
 language is central to the formation of subjectivity, that is, of both 
conscious and unconscious awareness  
 certain groups in any society are privileged over others, constituting 
an oppression that is most forceful when subordinates accept their 
social status as natural, necessary or inevitable 
 oppression has many faces, and concern for only one form of 
oppression at the expense of others can be counterproductive 
because of the connection between them 
 mainstream research practices are generally implicated, albeit often 
unwittingly, in the reproduction of class, race, and gender 
oppression. 
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Building on these assumptions, this thesis sees the notion of explicit 
CSR (Matten and Moon, 2005, 2008) as socially and historically 
constituted in which its ideological orientation is the result and 
outcome of certain privileged groups power within the system of 
capitalist production and consumption (e.g., Levy, 2008; Shamir, 
2004a, 2004b) and where the positivist (e.g., Porter and Kramer, 2002, 
2006) and part of the monological postpositive CSR paradigm (e.g., 
Swanson, 1995, 1999) contributes to the reproduction and potential 
strengthening of the very ideological system informing explicit CSR in 
the first place. Some of the instrumental CSR perspectives – often 
inclined in epistemological and theoretical assumptions of objectivism 
and positivism – do that through constructing the ‘business case’ for 
CSR (e.g., Elkington, 1994, 1997), in which both business and society 
are portrayed as better off by institutional structures emphasising 
voluntary exchange, competitive markets, and private contracts. In a 
similar manner, some of the duty-aligned perspectives do that not 
through questioning the institutionally constituted power and interest of 
business, but instead make responsible business to questions of 
individual moral reasoning, thus implicitly closing the door to 
discussions about institutional mechanisms to inform responsible 
business conduct. The critically oriented perspective informing this 
thesis is not an all-encompassing critical theory of society (e.g., 
Habermas, 1984), but rather a more middle-range (Merton, 1968)23 
critical perspective in which the assumptions of the dominant 
instrumental and ethical CSR perspectives are called into question. This 
is done through framing the analysis by a theoretical perspective – the 
                                                 
23 Merton (1968, p. 39) defined a middle range theory as ‘theories that lie between the 
minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance in day-to-day 
research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop unified theory that will 
explain all the observed uniformities of social behaviour, organization and social 
change.’ 
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new institutional theory of political science – which  questions the 
ability of business in contributing to the common good through 
individualistic and corporate oriented strategies (such as instrumental 
CSR perspectives), or through individualistic moral reasoning and 
altruistic behaviour (such as duty-aligned perspectives).  
4.2.1 Final Remarks on the Research Prologue 
The epistemological position – and consequently theoretical 
perspectives, methodology, and methods – were by no means clear 
when this researcher started out the journey towards what would 
become a sketch of a (possible) convergent institutional perspective on 
CSR. Rather than starting with a clarified epistemological position – 
embodying certain assumptions informing theoretical perspectives and 
an overall research design – the research started with a real-life issue – 
CSR – that needed to be addressed, but without any clear understanding 
of its contested nature (Moon, Crane, and Matten, 2005; Windsor, 
2006)24, and thus, of the nature of the research inquiry, aims and 
research questions.  
Due to choices taken within the frames of two projects in which this 
researcher participated, there was identified a need for developing an 
instrument to measure managers’ perceptions of CSR. Thus, the 
research of this thesis started out on the foundation of some choices 
that were taken within the frames of a larger research project on CSR. 
These choices very much defined the nature of research carried out 
throughout the work with the thesis, research that would eventually be 
reported as the fourth and final paper of the thesis.  
                                                 
24 Connolly (1983) gives three reasons why concepts are essentially contested: 
because they are ‘appraisive’ or are considered as valued; they are internally complex; 
and they have open rules of application. CSR has all of these characteristics.   
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The underlying epistemological and theoretical assumptions of the 
choices taken within the frame of the research project, were those of 
objectivism and positivism: Meaning and meaningful reality exist apart 
from the operation of any consciousness, and are to be objectively 
discovered – and sometimes, as in article IV of this thesis – measured 
through such empirical research and methodologies and methods as 
survey research and scaling.  
As the work with the thesis and the research projects proceeded – but 
after some choices of methods and methodology were taken – this 
researcher, through literature studies within the field of business and 
society, and through engaging with the empirical field of CSR, became 
more aware of the nature of CSR and of his own position about its 
meaning and implications. Alongside the questions of scale 
development and measurement of some objective reality and meaning, 
the research developed in the directions of interpretivism and critical 
inquiries, that – based on the epistemological assumptions of 
constructionism – made critical questions of the meaning and potential 
implications of CSR as the key focus of the research for the thesis, 
informing more ‘discourse analysis’ methodologies and embedded 
methods. Within these lines of inquiries, meaning is not something to 
be objectively discovered and measured as within the tradition of 
objectivism and positivism, but rather something to be constructed, 
coming into existence in and out of our engagement with our area of 
interest. As such, the focus shifted from an interest in seeking 
objective, valid, and generalisable conclusions, to seeking plausible and 
suggestive results. In sum then, partly as a result of choices taken 
within the research project that framed a large part of the work with this 
thesis, and partly as the result of the journey of the researcher within 
the contested field of CSR, the research reported in the different papers 
of this thesis builds on very different and incompatible epistemological 
assumptions.  
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4.3 Research Design (or the Construction of 
Plots) 
This section discusses the overall research design and modes of inquiry 
in this thesis. It does thus not discuss the research design of the 
different papers constituting part II of this thesis. Consequently, it does 
not discuss their data collection method, lines of reasoning and 
trustworthiness. Rather, the section relates to the overall research 
design and modes of inquiry, an inquiry in which these papers is 
included, but what is important is not the research and scientific nature 
of each paper, but how the papers enter into, and are used to construct 
the overall plot of the study 
The research design of the thesis reflects the aim of contributing to the 
development of a convergent perspective on CSR, dividing the inquiry 
into three areas: the institutionally contingent and embedded nature of 
CSR, its potential institutional and political implications, and the 
appropriate role of business in society. Most importantly, research 
design refers to how the plan for the research (e.g., selection of 
theoretical perspectives, methods of data collection and analysis) fits 
the aim of the research. Scott and Marshall (2009) thus define research 
design in the following way: 
The strategic plan for a research project (…), setting out the 
broad outline and key features of the work to be undertaken, 
including the methods of data collection and analysis to be 
employed, and showing how the research strategy addresses the 
specific aims and objectives of the study, and whether the 
research issues are theoretical or policy-oriented. 
The research design of this thesis can be outlined as evolving around an 
inquiry into the construction of a plot (Czarniawska, 2004) constituted 
by several linked sub-plots, and in which some aspects of a theory, 
concept, line of reasoning, and empirical data are emphasised and 
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where other aspects are excluded or moderated, all in order to support 
the construction of the thesis’ overall plot and research aim.   
According to Polkinghorne (1987, p. 570), a plot functions to 
‘transform a listing of events into a schematic whole by highlighting 
and recognizing the contribution that certain events make to the 
development of the whole’. Further, plots ‘[have] the capacity to 
articulate and consolidate complex treads of multiple activities by 
means of the overlap of subplots’ (p. 19). A ‘simple’ deductive or 
inductive chronology of events is thus not sufficient to tell a story. 
What is needed, is rather an abductive line of inquiry (Danermark, et 
al., 1997): a constant back-and-forth between theory and empirical data 
(Wodak, 2004), and between theoretical constructs and new theories in 
which those constructs are encompassed and analysed, informing a 
potentially new understanding of or additions to the theoretical 
construct of interest. 
This study consists of several (sub) plots which are connected to each 
other in the plot of the thesis. According to Todurov (1977), such a 
combination of (sub) plots is usually done by linking or embedding. In 
the former, plots are fitted together; in the latter, a plot (or several sub-
plots) is set inside another (main) plot. In addition, Czarniawska (2004) 
argues that as social scientists, we must choose the elements of the 
story that we would like to tell out of a veritable chaos of events 
already constituted (White, 1973), making two additional tactics part of 
our scientific inquiry: exclusion and emphasis. In other words, some 
aspects of a theory, line of reasoning, concept, and empirical data are 
excluded while others are emphasised in order to construct the plots of 
the story that we want to tell. This also implies that other plots and 
stories could be constructed from the very same theoretical perspective, 
reasoning, concept, and empirical data, given a different emphasis and 
thus also exclusion, a point to which I will return below.           
At its most basic, a plot can be considered as a way of theorising 
(Czarniawska, 2004), thus also embedding questions of research 
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design: What is the plan for the scientific inquiry? What work need to 
be undertaken in order to address and construct the plot of the research? 
What theoretical perspectives (and which aspects of these perspectives) 
are appropriate for the task at hand? What theoretical perspectives can 
the inquiry be contrasted against? What empirical data can support the 
construction of the plot and its sub-plots? What line of reasoning can 
support the inquiry at hand? In brief, these questions constitute the 
research design of this thesis.  
The following are some of the ideas and sub-plots  from which this 
thesis has been constructed, and that have informed its research design: 
the understanding of CSR as institutional contingent and embedded 
(e.g., Campbell, 2007), the idea of the business firm as not only an 
economic, but also social and even political actor in society (e.g. 
Matten, 2009), the understanding of CSR as including not only what 
companies do beyond what is demanded by legal frameworks, but also 
including economic and legal responsibilities (e.g., Carroll, 1979), and 
implicit notions of CSR (Matten and Moon, 2005, 2008), the idea of 
CSR’s potential to impact and undermine the institutional and political 
pre-requisites for a functioning democracy, the understanding of CSR 
as developing from the business need for justifying its own activity 
within the context of increasing societal scepticism about the 
contribution of business to the common good (e.g. Frederick, 1987), the 
understanding of CSR as involving some notions of agency/autonomy 
(Marrewijk, 2003) and institutional embedded entrepreneurship, a 
distrust in the ability of the free market alone to inform responsible 
business, a scepticism about the ability of instrumental and duty-
aligned CSR perspectives in themselves to support the common good, a 
belief in collective as superior to corporate mechanism in promoting 
notions of responsibility, and the idea of politics as more appropriate 
than philosophy and ethics in informing the appropriate role and 
responsibility of business in society (e.g., Scherer and Palazzo, 2007).   
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Building on these and related ideas and sub-plots, appropriate 
theoretical frameworks and perspectives, notions of corporate 
responsibility, literatures, methodologies, and methods were chosen, or 
more precisely, were judged as more or less appropriate for the task at 
hand. The question for the overall design was thus: What theories, 
literatures, empirical data, and so on are most appropriate for 
constructing the story that I wanted to tell through the research?  
What is important to note, is that the plot of the thesis – and indeed 
most of the sub-plots – did not develop until I was well into the 
research project. When they did, it was a result of some underlying idea 
of what the story should look like, and based on a constant movement 
between notions of CSR, theoretical perspectives, empirical data, and 
lines of reasoning, informing certain emphases and exclusions, and 
certain linkages between ideas. For example: What notions of CSR 
incorporate economic and legal, as well as ethical categories of 
responsibility? Why does most of the CSR literature seem to focus on 
the implications of CSR for the financial performance of the firm and 
not on its potential societal implications (the latter in which the concept 
originally – as argued by Bowen (1953) was intended to support)? 
What theoretical perspectives can emphasise the political nature of 
CSR, and from what position is it possible to critically discuss the 
seemingly dominant position of explicit (Matten and Moon, 2005, 
2008) and social activist (Brummer, 1991) notions of CSR? How can 
the dual construct of explicit and implicit CSR be further developed 
based on the empirical data at hand? The inquiry into these and related 
questions gradually developed into some sub-plot that would be linked 
in order to constitute the plot of the thesis in the form of a convergent 
institutional perspective on CSR. 
The research design has reflected the inquiry into these plots: 
Considering the choosing of the theoretical perspective (the new 
institutional theory of political science) it needed – given the sub-plots 
of the work and the story that I wanted to tell – to hold the possibility 
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for linking empirically and normative oriented analyses, it needed the 
ability to analyse the institutionally contingent and embedded nature of 
CSR, it needed the potential to critically discuss the impact of explicit 
CSR on the very same institutional and political framework informing 
the explicit manifestation of CSR in the first place, and it needed to 
have the potential to discuss the institutional and political justifications 
for the role and responsibility of business in society.   
Given the theoretically more than policy (or empirical) aim of this 
thesis, that is, contributing to the development of a convergent 
institutional theory of CSR, the search for and discussions of 
appropriate perspectives and concepts became more important than the 
empirical analysis. Thus, more than a (abductive) movement between 
theory and empirical data, the research design embedded a constant 
search for different perspectives in which the notion of CSR could be 
discussed, and that could be used in the construction of the plot of the 
thesis. At the same time, empirical data collected through focus group 
interviews constituted a necessary element for the construction of 
different institutionally informed models of CSR, and the role of 
agency in this construction (Article I). In addition, the focus groups 
interviews constituted the foundation for the development of items for 
the theoretically informed issue dimensions of CSR (Article IV). The 
following three sections reflect on the thesis’ theoretical perspective 
and comments on the modes of data production and construction, 
analysis and interpretation. 
4.3.1 Selection of Theoretical Perspective 
In this thesis, the new institutional theory of political science is used as 
an overarching theoretical framework for drawing together three 
aspects or dimensions of an institutional analysis of CSR, 1) the 
institutionally contingent and embedded nature of CSR, 2) the potential 
political and institutional implications of CSR, and 3) the justification 
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of the role and responsibility of business in society from an institutional 
perspective. That means that the discussion in the thesis relies not 
solely on new institutional theory, but more importantly uses these 
theoretical lenses framing the different modes of inquiries conducted in 
the four papers of the thesis.     
Why choose the new institutionalism of political science in order to 
support the construction of the thesis’ plot? Other perspectives could 
and have been used to address the role and responsibility of business in 
society, for example, stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) 
and social contract theory (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999). It can also be 
argued that it is difficult to ignore the literature on ‘corporate political 
activity’ (CPA) when discussing the political nature of CSR and the 
activities of the corporate entity. There are, however, good reasons to 
be careful with critical analysis about the political nature of CSR from 
this body of research. As stated by Hillmain, Keim, and Schuler (2004), 
this literature  
shows next to no awareness of the fact that though business may 
use the political sphere to realize its strategic goals, this 
influence has fundamental and highly problematic consequences 
for democracy, the public good, and some vital principles of 
political representation and decision making (Matten, 2009). 
While the analysis of this thesis certainly incorporates other theoretical 
perspectives (i.e., functionalism, pragmatism, Marxist functionalism, 
neoinstitutionalism, democracy, citizenship), there are some good 
reasons for choosing the new institutionalism of political science as the 
perspective for constructing and building a case for the plot of this 
thesis. 
First, the perspective is a social constructivist one (March and Olsen, 
1996; Scott, 1995, 2001). Politics is depicted in contrast to an exchange 
perspective. Rather than understanding politics as a market for trades in 
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which individual and group interests are pursued by rational actors in 
an atomistic society, the institutional perspective emphasises the 
creation – or social construction – of institutions and identities, and the 
structuring effects of institutions (March and Olsen, 1996, p. 249): 
The exchange vision of human nature as static and universal and 
unaffected by politics is replaced by a view of the political actor 
as flexible, varied, malleable, culture-dependent and socially 
constructed. Intentional, calculative action is embedded in rules 
and institutions that are constituted, sustained, and interpreted in 
a political system. The core notion is that life is organised by 
sets of shared meanings and practices that come to be taken as 
given for a long time. Political actors act and organise 
themselves in accordance with rules and practices which are 
socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated and accepted. 
Actions of individuals and collectives occur within these shared 
meanings and practices, which can be called institutions and 
identities.  
The underlying idea of behaviour – and thus notions of responsibility – 
as an inherent aspect of the structures of political rules, institutions, and 
identities (e.g., March and Olsen, 1996) thus flies in the face of the 
methodologist individualistic assumptions of instrumental and duty-
aligned CSR perspectives of challenges of CSR as primarily an issue of 
individual preference-based action.    
Second, the new institutionalism of political science represents a 
coherent framework within which the two descriptive questions of the 
implications of institutions on manifestations of CSR, and the 
implications of manifestations of CSR on (political) institutions, and  
within which the normative question of the political role and 
responsibility of business in society can be critically addressed. 
Although the perspective is more empirical than normative (March and 
Olsen, 1996), it incorporates aspects of the “old” institutionalism 
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emphasising the role of philosophy and norms in the institutional 
analysis, echoing the Aristotelian judgement of man as at his worst 
when divorced from law and morals, and building on a vision of a 
political order based on institutions (Wolin, 1960, 2004). The 
perspective thus holds the possibility of encompassing and converging 
empirical and normative analyses in which empirical inquiry is 
anchored in some value-judgement, and where further justification and 
normative reasoning are partly based on our understanding of the world 
as interpreted from empirical modes of inquiry. As stated by Hardin 
(2008, p. 39): ‘the world we wish to judge normatively is the same 
world that we wish to explain positively.’      
Third, the perspective builds on idea of agency, and thus contradicts 
much of the current comparative institutional CSR analysis that 
explicitly or implicitly emphasises homogeneity within institutional 
fields: ‘Institutionalism involves purposeful human agency, reflection, 
and reason giving as well as rules’ (Olsen, 2009, p. 9.). At the same 
time, an institutional perspective’s ontological approach to actors 
merits some emphasis: 
…the notion of field reminds us that the true object of social 
science is not the individual, even though one cannot construct a 
field if not though individuals, since the information necessary 
for statistical analysis is generally attached to individuals or 
institutions. It is the field which is primary and must be the 
focus of the research operations. This does not imply that 
individuals are mere “illusions”, that they do not exist: they 
exist as agents – and not as biological individuals, actors, or 
subjects – who are socially constituted as active and acting in 
the field under consideration by the fact that they possess the 
necessary  properties to be effective, to produce effects, in the 
field. And it is knowledge about the field itself in which they 
evolve that allows us best to grasp the roots of their singularity, 
their point of view or position (in a field) from which their 
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particular vision of the world (and of the field itself) is 
constructed (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 107). 
Fourth, the perspective – although argued by March and Olsen (1984, 
1996) not should be understood as a complete theory, but rather as a 
collection of ideas about politics and the potential effects of political 
institutions deviating from the study of politics and behaviour as seen 
by contextualism, reductionalism and utilitarianism – is a well 
developed, respected, and acknowledged one, described by Goodin and 
Klingeman (1996, p. 25) as constituting part of a new institutionalism 
with the power to provide an ‘integrative framework’ and even 
representing the ‘next revolution’ in political science.  
Although there are some valid reasons for building on the new 
institutional perspective for the analysis of this study, the selection of 
this perspective do not come without problems. The perspective is 
usually applied to the study of political institutions (March and Olsen, 
2005). In this thesis, the perspective is extended to the relationship 
between society (especially political institutions) and the social 
institution of business and companies. Although such an approach 
incurs the risk of conceptual stretching (Sartori, 1970) and 
reductionism, it can also be seen as a valuable extension of the basic 
argument (Peters, 1996, p. 211) of politics as informed by institutions. 
That means that while the new institutionalism argues that behaviour 
within the frames of formal organisations and politics can and should 
be understood as arising from collective values and norms, in this 
thesis, I extend the area of application of the theory and argues that the 
theory also can account for the norms, values, and stable pattern of 
interactions and relationships between a society and its political 
institutions, and businesses and companies.      
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4.3.2 Data Production and Construction25 
The construction of the thesis ‘by plots’ can be depicted as follows: 
The theoretical perspective supporting and framing the plot of the 
thesis is the new institutionalism of political science. The perspectives 
from which the different ‘events’ of the research – most importantly, 
the articles and their theoretical perspectives  and lines of reasoning – 
are thereby transformed into a schematic whole through systematic 
emphasis and deemphasis of aspects of the different events of the 
research. Article (or event) I builds on theories of neoinstitutionalism 
(e.g., Friedland and Alford, 1991; Lounsbury, 2008; Meyer and Rowan, 
1977) and institutional entrepreneurship (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988; 
Maguire and Hardy, 2006; Zilber, 2002) in order to explore the 
institutionally contingent nature of CSR and the possibility of 
conflicting institutional logics informing agency the construction of 
hybrid models of CSR (e.g., Boxenbaum, 2006). In the study, this line 
of reasoning is reframed within the new institutional perspective to 
stress the role of agency in the manifestations of different institutional 
embedded models of CSR. Article (or event) II builds on functionalism 
and a Marxist-institutionalist perspective (Jones, 1996) in order to 
discuss the potential negative societal implications of social activist 
(Brummer, 1991) conceptions of CSR, and in order to discuss the social 
responsibility of business in society. This line of reasoning is reframed 
within the new institutional perspective to support an argument of the 
                                                 
25 This section discusses the data production and construction of the thesis, that is, 
how the plots of the articles constructed from the new institutional perspective enter 
into the analysis and inquiry of the thesis. Thus, I do not discuss the methods of data 
collection of the articles (focus group interviews and management survey) because, 
from a methodological point of view, what is important for the analysis is how the 
articles – as ‘data’ and being presented as ‘Results’ in chapter 5 – enters into the 
analysis of the thesis. For information about data collection methods, see part two of 
the thesis and the relevant articles.   
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potential institutional and political implications of explicit expansionist 
manifestations of CSR. Article (or event) III builds on pragmatism and 
the notion of jurisgenerative politics (Benhabib, 2006, 2008) in order to 
suggest how the principles of CSR (Wood, 1991) can be strengthened 
and come to constitute a justified foundation for companies’ efforts in 
the societal arena. This line of reasoning is reframed within the new 
institutional perspective to propose a political rather than an 
instrumental or ethical justification of the institutional and political 
responsibility of business in society. In addition, the pragmatic stance is 
also used as an epistemological and theoretical orientation for the 
inquiry of the thesis, and one that can be contrasted to both positivist 
and anti-positivist CSR research. Article (event) IV builds on theories 
of development democracy (e.g. Dahl, 1982, 1989; Marshall, 1965, and 
Rawls, 1973, 1993), the conceptual vantage point of citizenship (e.g. 
Stokes, 2002) and thinking of the corporate entity as a citizen (e.g. 
Moon, Crane, and Matten, 2005, and Nèron and Norman, 2008) to 
develop and validate a scale measuring managers’ orientation towards 
seven issue components of CSR: socio-economic development, anti-
corruption and bribery, environmental responsibility, workers’ rights 
and welfare, supply-chain responsibility, political participation, and 
accountability. In the study, this line of reasoning is reframed within 
the new institutional perspective in order to build and support a case for 
the political nature of the firm and for CSR issues. Finally, the different 
events or sub-plots are transformed into a schematic whole within the 
new institutional perspective in order to suggest a possible convergent 
institutional perspective on CSR, embedding both empirical analysis – 
in which CSR functions as both explanans and explanandum – and 
normative analysis.  
4.3.3 Analysis and Interpretation 
The modes of analysis and interpretation conducted in this thesis – 
though not in all of the articles – can best be characterised as a form of 
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abduction (e.g., Danemark, et al., 1997), a form of reasoning with some 
affinity to the pragmatist orientation (e.g., Rorty, 1991) of this study 
(Dey, 2004). In contrast to deduction – in which we start with a theory, 
make an observation and infer a result – and induction – in which we 
start with observations for them to generalise to a wider population – in 
abduction, we can go in one of two directions.  We can start with 
theory, make observations, and draw some inference about those 
observations consistent with the theory. Alternatively, we can start with 
an observation and state a theory in order to infer a result (Dey, 2004). 
Either or, through abduction, observations are related to a theory (or the 
theory is related to the observations), and result in an interpretation 
rather than a logical conclusion (Dey, 2004). Differently put, what is 
important is that the results of a study do not – like with deduction – 
necessarily follow from the premises, but rather constitute a plausible 
interpretation of a phenomenon. Abductive inference is thus a matter of 
interpreting a phenomenon in terms of some theoretical frame of 
reference, but where the outcome not constitutes the only ‘true’ 
interpretation, but rather – given the theoretical frame of reference – 
constitutes a possible and meaningful interpretation given the 
phenomenon of interest.   
Danemark et al., (1997, p. 91) defines abduction as ‘a move from a 
conception of something to a different, possibly more developed or 
deeper conception of it’, happening through our placing and 
interpretation of a phenomenon within the new (theoretical) ideas. The 
modes of reasoning constitute itself as processes of reconceptualisation, 
in which the researcher outline and interpret something within a new 
framework. This ‘something’ need not be restricted to some empirical 
observation, but can also be a particular theoretical construct – like 
CSR – or a thought, argument, or reasoning.  
Abduction is often depicted as a mode of analysis and inquiry involving 
a certain inference based on some empirical observation and a theory 
(e.g., Danemark et al., 1997; Jensen, 1995). However, in this study, 
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abduction does not solely refer to a mode of inquiry in which empirical 
observations are related to some theoretical construct (e.g., Article I), 
but also to situations in which some lines of reasoning, arguments, and 
theoretical constructs are placed within some theoretical frame in order 
to generate reconceptualisations and potential new modes of theoretical 
and empirical analysis (e.g., Article II and III). This has been the line of 
reasoning that guides the inquiry and analysis of the articles and of the 
study as a whole.  
In article I, empirical observations about the nature of CSR are 
interpreted within the theoretical frame institutional theory and the 
dualistic notion of explicit and implicit CSR (Matten and Moon, 2005, 
2008), partly in order to infer more developed and nuanced conceptions 
of explicit and implicit conceptualisations of CSR. The modes of 
reasoning thus takes the form of a reinterpretation in which empirical 
observations of CSR is interpreted within a theoretical framework – 
that, for the purpose of the inquiry, is developed by including theories 
of institutional entrepreneurship – resulting in the development of four 
models of CSR: explicit expansionist and contractive CSR, and implicit 
contractive and expansionist CSR. The trustworthiness of the analysis 
does – like in article IV –depend not only on the consistency among 
theory, methodology and observations and analysis, but more 
importantly on its capacity to generate new ‘reinterpreted’ insights, 
which taken together can inform a new account of the subject under 
investigation, that is, the notion of CSR. The interpretation is not the 
one and only ‘true’ outcome of the study, but it is a possible and 
plausible one.       
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In article II, what Brummer (1991) desscribes to as the social activist 
approach to CSR26 is framed within functionalism in order to inform a 
critical inquiry into the potential societal, institutional, and political 
implications of this manifestation of CSR, and in order to discuss the 
role and responsibility of business in society. The interpretation 
emerging from this discussion is not the only possible one. However, 
given the premises of the inquiry – the understanding of CSR as social 
activism and the idea of the common good as best aimed for if the core 
institutions of society stick to their basic mission – the interpretation is, 
as with Article I, a possible and plausible one. 
In Article III, the abductive line of reasoning is again prominent. Here, 
the principles of CSR (Wood, 1991; Wood and Jones, 1995) – 
legitimacy (Davis, 1973), public responsibility (Preston and Post, 
1975), managerial discretion (Carroll, 1979) – are reinterpreted from a 
pragmatic perspective (Wicks and Freeman, 1998) in which the notion 
of democratic iteration and jurisgenerative politics (Benhabib, 2008) is 
used as a theoretical frame for developing and suggesting a new 
meaning of the original CSR principles. The notion of legitimacy, 
public responsibility and managerial discretion is thus interpreted 
within and on the basis of some different and new theoretical ideas, 
informing a reconceptualisation constituting a potential new and 
politicised (e.g., Matten, 2009; Scherer, Palazzo, and Matten, 2009) 
way of understanding the social responsibility of business in society.        
In the study as a whole, the abductive line of reasoning takes a new and 
different form. Here, the ‘results’ of the articles – that is, the line of 
arguments, reconceptualisations, and reinterpretations of the articles 
(including the results of Article IV) – are discussed within the new 
                                                 
26 The social activist approach to CSR can also be referred to as what I have called 
explicit expansionist CSR, combining corporate level responsibility strategies with a 
potentially broad range of issues for the corporate entity to attend to. (See article I.) 
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theoretical frame of the new institutional perspective of political 
science (e.g., March and Olsen, 1984, 1996, Olsen, 2009) in order to 
sketch a convergent institutional perspective on CSR that embeds 
empirical and normative analyses that support each other in a dialectic 
fashion. The line of reasoning does thus not ‘discover’ something new, 
but rather develops a alternative analytical framework for the 
institutional embedded nature of CSR, its implications and justification, 
that differs from what is offered by the dominant instrumental and 
duty-aligned CSR perspectives (and by much of the current institutional 
analysis of CSR). What is worth noticing, is that in this interpretation 
and line of reasoning, the objectivist and positivist Article VI 
constitutes and is included as part of a constructionist and critically 
informed pragmatic endeavour. As such, what is important for the 
analysis, is not necessarily the epistemological and theoretical 
orientation and the methodology and methods applied in each of the 
articles, but rather how the articles and other research enter into and are 
used within the framework of a new theoretical perspective (the new 
institutionalism).   
4.4 The Trustworthiness of the Study    
A consequence of the abductive line of reasoning followed in this study 
is of course that there are no fixed or definitive criteria by which it is 
possible to assess or judge the validity of this study’s interpretations 
and conclusions (Danermark et al., 1997). What is important about this 
particular line of reasoning, is that ‘more than one plot can provide a 
meaningful constellation and integration for the same set of events, and 
different plot organizations change the meaning of the individual events 
as their roles are reinterpreted according to their functions in different 
plots’ (Polkinghorne, 1987, p. 19). As such, there is a considerable 
amount of subjectivity involved in the analysis informing a sketch of a 
possible convergent institutional perspective on CSR. It is difficult to 
see how this could not be the case.  In this respect, Dahl’s (1982, p. 23-
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24) discussion about the subjectivity of analysis of the relative 
autonomy of business vis-à-vis governments and political organisations 
is highly relevant:  
How great is the control of major oil companies over 
congressional energy legislation? Not only would an answer to 
require one to appraise a vast body of complex information 
(some not readily available, if at all), but in the absence of an 
acceptable measure of magnitudes, different observers are likely 
to reach different qualitative judgements.   
As such, an abductive line of reasoning also involves a considerable 
degree of creativity and imagination (e.g., Danemark, 1997), a 
creativity and imagination that could informed a different construction 
of plot and sub-plots – e.g., through emphasising and linkingother 
aspects of the notion of CSR with other aspects of the institutional 
perspective – than what is presented as the outcome of the research 
reported in this thesis.  
The methodological “move” of this thesis can be summarised as 
organised around the construction and analysis of plots. Following 
Czarniawska (2004), and given the nature of the research carried out in 
this project, the thesis should thus be evaluated as an emplotment. This 
being the case, the questions become: Is the plot coherent? Does it 
contain a basic plot structure, with complicating sub-plots and counter- 
plots? The following answer can be suggested: What is noteworthy is 
the level of the analysis. The articles – constituting part two of this 
thesis – constitute level 1 of the inquiry, informed by a specific 
epistemological, theoretical, and methodological orientation. The 
inquiry of the thesis – its observations and aim, theoretical perspective 
(new institutionalism), methodology, results, and discussion – 
constitutes level 2 of the inquiry. In the level 2 inquiry, the articles 
constitute the material from which the analysis – given the 
observations, aim, and theoretical perspective – can proceed towards 
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the final outline of insights into some building blocks of a convergent 
institutional CSR perspective. The eclecticism and partial inconsistency 
in philosophical and epistemological orientation between the articles 
could have been a problem for the overall and level 2 analyses. After 
all, how is it possible to unite the objectivistic and positivistic 
orientations of Article VI, the constructivist and critically oriented 
orientations of Article II, the pragmatist orientation of Article III, and 
the social constructivist orientation of Article I within a single social 
constructivist and critically informed level 2 inquiry? The answer is 
found in what the construction of plots. What constitutes the material 
from which the analysis proceeds at level 2 is not the articles per se, but 
rather the sub-plots that this researcher construct in them given the 
(social constructivist) new institutional perspective and the aim of 
discussing an institutional convergent CSR perspective constituting a 
possible alternative to instrumental and duty-aligned CSR perspectives. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Research Articles  
This chapter summarises the main analytical content and argument of 
the four articles included in the thesis. The institutional embedded 
nature of manifestations of CSR is elaborated and illustrated in Article 
I. On the normative level the article also discuses some possible 
political and collective level alternatives to the explicit CSR model. 
Article II addresses the potential institutional and political implications 
of CSR. On this background, the article argues in favour of a 
conceptualization of CSR in which the political responsibility of 
business is highlighted. Article III further elaborates the potential 
societal implications of CSR, and argues for a pragmatic approach to 
the role and responsibility of business in society in which 
jurisgenerative politics and democratic iterations constitute a possible 
frame for critical questioning and justification of competing moral 
claim. Article IV builds on democratic theory and the notion of 
corporate citizenship in order to outline seven CSR issues-dimensions 
the corporate entity currently are expected to assume a responsibility 
for, and act on. Table 2 provides an overview of the articles, that is, 
their main research questions, analytical focus and argument.   
Table 2. Overview of articles and their main analytical focus and research questions 
Number in thesis Main argument Thesis research question 
addressed 
Article I 
Multiple and Contesting 
Perceptions of Explicit 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility Within a 
The article takes the explicit-
implicit CSR framework as a 
point of departure, and 
basically asks how managers 
within a national 
institutionalised context 
 
 
How can institutional theory 
contribute to our 
understanding of the 
institutional contingent 
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National institutionalised 
Field 
perceive the notion of explicit 
CSR, and how the national 
institutional context can 
contribute to our 
understanding of manager’s 
perceptions of CSR. 
nature of CSR and different 
manifestations of CSR within 
national-level fields?    
 
Article II  
Corporate Social 
Responsibility: the 
Economic and 
Institutional responsibility 
of Business in Society 
The article argues that CSR 
can be counterproductive to 
the institutional conditions 
required for a sustainable 
development path. On this 
background, the article argues 
in favour of an orientation 
towards a political 
conceptualization of CSR 
What are the potential 
institutional and political 
implications of explicit 
manifestations of CSR? 
 
How can institutional theory 
contribute to discussions of a 
justified foundation for 
companies’ efforts in the 
societal arena?    
Article III 
A Reinterpretation of the 
Principles of CSR: A 
Pragmatic Approach 
The article argues for a 
pragmatic approach to the role 
and responsibility of business 
in society, in which the 
normative deficiencies of 
Corporate Social Performance 
theory can be strengthened 
through democratic iterations 
over some or the other ethical 
treaty. 
 
What are the potential 
institutional and political 
implications of explicit 
manifestations of CSR? 
 
How can institutional theory 
contribute to discussions of a 
justified foundation for 
companies’ efforts in the 
societal arena?    
Article IV 
Development and 
Validation of the CSR 
Issues Scale: A Corporate 
Citizenship Perspective  
Based on the conceptual 
vantage point of citizenship 
and thinking of the corporate 
entity as a citizen, seven 
different CSR issue 
components are identified and 
empirically validated. 
 
How can institutional theory 
contribute to discussions of a 
justified foundation for 
companies’ efforts in the 
societal arena?    
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5.2 Analytical Content of Article I 
Taking the explicit-implicit CSR framework (Matten and Moon, 2005, 
2008) as its point of departure, Article I basically asks a) how managers 
within a national institutionalised context perceive the notion of explicit 
CSR, and b) how the national institutional context can contribute to our 
understanding of the managers’ perceptions of CSR. The empirical 
results of focus group interviews with Norwegian managers indicate the 
existence of multiple perceptions and manifestations of CSR within a 
national institutionalised setting.  
Two observations inform the theoretical arguments and empirical 
illustration and illumination of the article. The first observation is that 
the explicit-implicit CSR framework, together with some of the current 
institutional analysis of CSR, relies on a somewhat one-dimensional 
and over-deterministic account of institutional theory that only to a 
limited degree take into account recent developments within 
institutional theory (e.g., Lounsbury, 2008). That theory explains how 
to account for heterogeneity, contestation and practice variation, as well 
as homogeneity and consensus within a distinct institutional field. 
Furthermore, through emphasizing how a dominant and exclusive 
(Scott, 1994, 2001) institutional logic of the role and responsibility of 
business in society informs consensus around the manifestations of 
CSR within an institutionalised national framework, the explicit-
implicit CSR framework somewhat ignores the very essence of the 
notion of CSR, that of managerial discretion or agency (e.g., Carroll, 
1979; Matten and Moon, 2008; Marrewijk, 2003). Consequently, the 
framework also somewhat ignores how actors not only adapt to their 
institutional context, but also often play an active role in shaping those 
contexts (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988; Maguire and Hardy, 2006; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Levy, Brown, and de Jong, 2009; Lounsbury, 2008). 
The second observation is that it is not really clear what comprises the 
institutionally-informed models of explicit and implicit CSR. While 
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explicit CSR is defined in terms of some corporate level properties, 
implicit CSR is defined more in terms of some institutional properties, 
that is, what are the institutional conditions that inform an implicit 
manifestation of CSR, rather than what it is. This limitation has 
potentially both descriptive and normative implications. First, it makes 
it difficult to study the actual institutionalization or de-
institutionalization of one or the other manifestations of CSR within a 
national institutionalised context. Second, in its current form, the 
explicit, and especially implicit, models of CSR constitute somewhat 
unclear normative alternatives to the appropriate role and responsibility 
of business in society.   
The overall aim of the article is to suggest a further development and 
refinement of the explicit-implicit CSR framework, a development and 
refinement that a) take into account recent developments within neo-
institutional theory that explain how multiple logics and institutional 
contradictions within a nationalised institutionalised setting can enable 
agency and multiple manifestations of CSR, and that b) identify more 
closely what institutionally- informed, explicit and implicit 
manifestations of CSR comprise. 
Drawing on social constructionist assumptions (Berger and Luckmann, 
1967) emphasizing translation (Latour, 1986) at the micro-level 
(Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996), rather than diffusion of institutional 
phenomena, the article see institutions as formed and changed as 
meaning comes to be shared and taken for granted. Actors are not only 
carriers of institutional meaning (Zilber, 2002), but are also active 
interpreters, “formulating, conforming to, disobeying, and modifying” 
(Scott, 1994, p. 60) institutional phenomena in their efforts to make 
sense out of the world (Weick, 1995). In this respect, actors’ 
“sensemaking”, imagination and acts of interpretation of institutional 
phenomena – that is, the attribution of meanings to structures and 
practices (Zilber, 2002) – can be understood as an important form of 
institutional agency (e.g., Hajer, 1995; Maguire and Hardy, 2006; 
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Munir, 2005; Zilber, 2002, 2006), in which actors play a role in both 
shaping and being shaped by their institutional environment.      
Building on the theoretical thesis developed above, the assumption of 
homogeneity and consensus around manifestations of CSR within a 
national institutional framework can be questioned and challenged by 
an assumption of heterogeneity and contestation upon the manifestation 
of explicit CSR within a national institutionalised framework. If it can 
be assumed that both the logics of the liberal and coordinated markets 
are embedded in institutional fields at the national level, then both 
explicit and implicit manifestations of CSR will be evident within a 
specific national framework, as well as hybrid combinations of the two, 
as actors invoke the institutional logics and their embedded 
contradictions in order to make sense of the role and responsibility of 
business in society.  
The data evidently revealed the existence of multiple narratives about 
the appropriate meaning of explicit CSR, each constituted by a 
somewhat different set of statements or storylines.  
Narrative 1 can be labelled “the discourse of explicit expansionist 
CSR”. This discourse consists of some credible and attractive 
storylines: 1) the notion of the corporate entity as possessing an 
identified organizational-level responsibility for addressing some social 
issues, and 2) the notion that the corporate entity has a responsibility to 
address a broad range of issues on the societal arena. 
Narrative 2 can be labelled “the discourse of implicit contractive CSR”. 
This discourse consists of some credible and attractive storylines: 1) the 
notion of collective-level responsibility for social issues, and 2) the 
notion of a narrow range of social issues for the corporate entity to 
address within the framework of collective-level responsibility 
mechanisms. 
Results 
 85 
Narrative 3 can be labelled “the discourse of implicit expansionist 
CSR”. This discourse consists of some credible and attractive 
storylines: 1) the notion of collective-level responsibility for societal 
issues, and 2) the notion of a broad range of social issues for the 
corporate entity to address within the framework of some collective-
level responsibility mechanisms. 
Narrative 4 can be labelled “the discourse of explicit contractive CSR”. 
This discourse consists of some credible and attractive storylines: 1) the 
notion of corporate-level responsibility mechanisms, and 2) the notion 
that the corporate entity should address a narrow more than a broad, 
range of social issues through its corporate-level responsibility 
strategies and mechanisms. 
Within the current institutional analysis of CSR, it is common to argue 
that a national-level institutional field informs homogeneity and 
consensus around a specific manifestation of CSR within that national, 
institutionalised framework (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2007; Gjølberg, 2009; 
Matten and Moon, 2005, 2008). What Article I indicates, however, is 
that multiple and contesting perceptions of explicit CSR exist within a 
national institutional field. Each of the four different narratives or 
manifestations of CSR identified can be seen as being informed by 
different institutional logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, 
2004) – or a different combination of these, co-existing in the 
historically-grown, national institutional framework.  
The discussions and manifestations of explicit CSR should not, 
however, be understood as a “conventional” institutional analysis in 
which actors passively adapt to one or the other institutional script or 
logic. Rather, what the article indicates is that multiple logics and 
institutional contradictions inform agency (Clemens and Cook, 1999; 
Hardy and Maguire, 2008), through enable actors to attribute meaning 
to CSR in multiple ways. The actors become interpreters invoking, 
disobeying, and combining the features of different institutional logics 
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as they promulgate multiple translations of a new convention like 
explicit CSR. The institutional analysis of Article I thus highlight the 
discursive and interpretative struggles (Zilber, 2002) that occur in the 
context of the translation and institutionalisation of explicit CSR within 
a national institutional field. 
5.3 Analytical Content of Article II 
Article II argues that ethical CSR can be counterproductive to, and 
undermine the institutional conditions required for a sustainable 
development path. On this background, the article argues in favour of 
an orientation towards a political conceptualization of CSR in which 
business assumes a limited, rather than expansionist role in society. The 
article identifies business contribution to sustaining and developing 
political and collective level responsibility mechanisms, as a key area 
of CSR.    
Article II argues that an ethical approach to CSR can be 
counterproductive to, or undermine the institutional condition for a 
sustainable development path. Sustainable development rest on an 
institutional condition (Spangenberg, 2002): the power and capability 
of the states and political institutions to shape and implement national 
and international policy, laws, and regulations for more sustainable 
forms of development. CSR has the potential to undermine this 
condition. The central reason is that CSR may imply increased power 
to business in society at the possible expense of political and civil 
society power. At the same time, the foundational features of capitalism 
may work against using this power to integrate broader social and 
environmental considerations voluntarily in business decision-making 
and activity. 
The concept of CSR – and especially the ethical approach to it – largely 
ignores how the foundational features of capitalism and the basic 
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purpose of the firm itself within the capitalist system, structure and 
determine the pursuit of profit above all other considerations. 
Any capitalist firm essentially represents a package of human, 
physical, (and) capital resources that have been organized for a 
single overriding purpose: the pursuit of profit for its owners. 
These organizations do not exist to solve society’s problems, or 
to provide enriching jobs for their members (unless there is a 
positive linkage between job satisfaction and labour 
productivity), or to satisfy customers’ needs. Employees are a 
resource to be utilized, a means to an end; society provides 
critical resources (e.g., customers, legitimacy) that the 
organization must obtain for survival and growth, as well as a site 
for externalizing the costs of production; customers’ needs are to 
be met (as well as created) not as an end in itself, but a means to 
secure profits.  
(Jones, 1996: 15) 
Although capitalism comes in various forms (Hall and Soskice, 2001), 
and there are many nuances to the picture depicted above, the point is 
that capitalism imposes great limitations on the voluntary integration of 
broader societal considerations in decision-making and activity. One 
would simply not expect capitalist organizations voluntarily to adopt 
behaviour that ‘flies directly in the face of their basic institutional 
rationality’ (Jones, 1996: 25). 
The suggested conceptualization of CSR builds on the classical 
approach to CSR (Brummer, 1991) and on functional theory (Parsons, 
1951) and builds on the following basic assumptions: 
Society may be understood as consisting of different but 
interacting spheres of activity: business, political and civil society 
(Waddell and Brown, 1997; Waddell, 2000), all framed by the 
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natural environment (Waddock, 2002) constituting the external 
limit of the total system (Daly, 1992). For the purpose of the 
functioning of the total system, the basic purpose of the different 
spheres of society differ; hence, the institutions belonging to the 
different spheres of society have different basic aims, roles, tasks, 
and responsibility. 
The basic aim of business – working within the economic sphere of 
society and within a system of democratic capitalism – is to make 
profit. Companies thus primarily have an economic responsibility 
towards society. Other institutions – political and civil society 
institutions – are better suited to perform tasks (e.g. the provision and 
administration of basic citizenship rights) that are outside the domain of 
wealth generation. 
The activity of companies – within the economic sphere of society – is 
framed by the larger society, including both political and civil society 
institutions (hence the notion of business in – and not and – society). 
The basic purpose of political institutions and governments may be 
characterized as, based upon democratic elections and processes of 
public policy, defining and establishing the ‘common good’. For the 
purpose of establishing that common good, business and companies 
thus have a responsibility not to undermine the capacity of political and 
civil society institutions to perform the task originating from their 
foundational role in society, an institutional responsibility. 
The basic idea of the institutional responsibility of business is to 
recognize a need for what Scherer and Palazzo (2007: 1097) call ‘a 
political order where economic rationality is circumscribed by 
democratic institutions and procedures’, and for businesses’ role in 
contributing to sustaining or building this order. 
Although institutional capacity building may work to strengthen rather 
than to undermine the political and governance framework necessary to 
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both regulate business and address complex societal challenges, it also 
has several potential ‘downsides’. Institutional capacity building may 
imply an increased influence of business in political discourses and 
agenda setting and a weakening of representative democracy (Martens, 
2007), just to mentioning two important challenges. The dilemma, of 
course, is that the capacity of those political institutions setting the 
agenda and defining the terms and conditions for capacity-building 
projects may be the lowest precisely where the need for capacity 
building is strongest. As such, it is possibly easier to defend business 
entering the political and societal arena in societies that already have 
powerful political institutions capable of defining the terms for 
increased business participation in that arena. 
The conceptualization of CSR is based on a primacy of politics and 
democracy to philosophy (Habermas, 1996; Rorty, 1991). It does not 
start with philosophical principles, but with a recognition of a changing 
interplay between governments, civil society actors and business, and 
the consequences of that dynamic (Sherer and Palazzo, 2007). Such a 
conceptualization of CSR is different from a social activist approach in 
several important respects. Most importantly, the social activist 
approach holds that universal standards exist for determining 
responsible corporate decisions and actions independent of the view of 
other, including political, interests. These standards typically have an 
ethical, religious or metaphysical basis (Brummer, 1991). This implies 
that, in considering the welfare of others, companies are to respond to 
their constituencies’ ideals rather than to expressed or current interests. 
Consequently, a CSR policy based on social activism is decoupled not 
only from the positions and interests of its current stakeholders, but 
also from processes of public policy. As such, the ideal CSR agenda – 
from a social activism position – is given based upon philosophical 
principles and moral reasoning outside the framework of public policy. 
This means that CSR, rather than being complementary to political 
solutions, constitutes itself as an alternative and competing framework 
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for solving social ills and challenges of sustainable development. 
Because corporate managers, in the role of moral leaders, voluntarily 
will address societal challenges because that is the right thing to do, 
there is no need for broader political solutions (implying increased risks 
for mandatory regulations). 
5.4 Analytical Content of Article III 
Article III argues for a pragmatic approach to the role and 
responsibility of business in society (Wicks and Freeman, 1998) in 
which the normative deficiencies of Corporate Social Performance 
(CSP) theory can be strengthened through democratic iterations 
(Benhabib, 2006, 2008) of some or the other ethical treatise, and thus 
provide a justified foundation for companies efforts on the societal 
arena, and for judging about those efforts.  
The theory of Corporate Social Performance (CSP) represents one of 
the most influential approaches within the business and society 
literature (Melè, 2008). This theory, which holds that business and 
society are interwoven entities and that business, on this background, 
has a responsibility to society in some way or the other, is perhaps best 
represented by Wood’s (1991) CSP model. The CSP model is a 
synthesis that includes a) principles of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), b) processes of corporate social responsiveness, and c) 
outcomes of corporate behaviour. The CSP model thus encompasses a 
normative foundation or principles of CSR expressing what companies 
ought to do, a descriptive element focusing on what companies in fact 
do in response to the principles of CSR, and an instrumental element 
that draws attention to the actual outcomes of CSR. Finally, the CSP 
model demonstrates the interrelationship among these three topics. 
Theories of Corporate Social Performance has been criticised for 
lacking a clear normative theory of business in society capable of 
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prescribing how management practice can reasonable move from “what 
is” to “what should be” (Swanson, 1995, 1999; Whetten, Rands, and 
Godfrey, 2002; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007; Van Oosterhout and 
Heugens, 2008).  
The potential problem with the CSP assumptions is that they do not 
open for a justification or critical questioning of the norms for 
appropriate behaviour defined by corporate constituencies (e.g. Scherer 
and Palazzo, 2007). As argued by van Oosterhout and Heugens (2008, 
p. 202), societal and stakeholder expectations cannot constitute the 
meaning and content of corporate responsibility unless these 
expectations are justified, and businesses, on this background, ought to 
contribute to their realization:  
“In general: your expectations toward A will only lead to A’s responsibility 
to meet them if they are justified. Without justification your expectations are 
just that. They would have no logical connection to any responsibility that A 
has”.  
Van Oosterhout and Heugens (2008) further argue that CSR can only 
have desirable meaning if it holds up against some normative principles 
that state a) what is desirable, and b) that business has a responsibility 
to contribute to addressing what is desirable.   
The lack of a critical judgement of stakeholder claims and their 
embedded moral becomes especially problematic since the claims of 
responsibility may be defined by vested and ethically questionable 
interests (Swanson, 1995). According to Scherer and Palazzo (2007, p. 
1099), the idea that the different claims of stakeholders upon the 
corporation would be legitimate “seems to be an illusory idea, 
considering that modern societies exhibit a plurality of particular and 
conflicting moralities”. In the case of conflicting interests and claims, 
Scherer and Palazzo (2007) suggest that power and urgency, as well as 
legitimacy (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, 1997) will explain and 
determine corporate response and behaviour in reaction to multitude 
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and conflicting claims put forward by corporate stakeholders and 
constituencies. The alignment of stakeholder claims with business 
activity has thus the potential to being counterproductive to notions of 
the common good (e.g. Dahl, 1982) or the values of our society (e.g. 
Bowen, 1953).    
If we assumes that this critique is valid, the questions then becomes 
how the normative basis of the CSP model can be strengthened so as to 
constitute a justified and legitimate ground for companies efforts on the 
societal arena, where moral claims of the role and responsibility of 
business in society is subject to  processes of critical questioning and 
judgement.  
In Article III, what can be called a pragmatic approach to the question 
of how the normative deficiencies of the CPS model can be addressed 
and strengthened is suggested. Most basically, pragmatism can be 
outlined as an adequate epistemology constituting an alternative to the 
study of organizations than what offered by positivist or anti-positivist 
approaches (Wicks and Freeman, 1998). For the purpose of the article 
however, pragmatism is outlined as ideas about the need for ethics in 
organizational studies and organizational life, and about the need for 
political justification of diverse moral claims and action.    
In contrast to positivism and anti-positivism, a pragmatic approach 
insists on a viable place for ethics in the study of organizations. The 
ultimate goal of organizational studies are understood as develop 
research that is focused on serving human purposes, such as knowledge 
being useful to organizations and the societies in which they operate. 
The key question for pragmatists is whether or not information – such 
as scientific data or a treatise of ethics – is useful in the sense of 
offering a viable alternative to organizational practice and life (Wicks 
and Freeman, 1998). A pragmatist approach would however not insist 
on the primacy of a specific treatise of ethics to the other. The issue is 
rather one of acknowledging the place for ethics in organizational life, 
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and one of “pragmatic experimentation” (Wicks and Freeman (1998, p. 
124) and a search for novel approaches that may help organizations 
serve a human purpose. As such, a pragmatic approach opens the door 
for justification or critical judgement of moral claim upon some or the 
other treatise of ethic. At the same time, from a pragmatic point of 
view, the ultimate justification of diverse moral claim rests not on some 
universal ethical principle, but on the idea of the primacy of politics 
and democracy over philosophy (Crick, 1962; Habermas, 1996; Rorty, 
1991). Pragmatism thus suggests political “conversations about ethics” 
(Wicks and Freeman, 1998, p. 131) as the central guiding principle for 
the critical inquiry of moral claims of corporate responsibility.  
In the article, we propose that the notion of jurisgenerative politics and 
democratic iterations (Benhabib, 2006, 2008), offer a space of 
democratic interpretation and intervention between universal principles 
and the context-dependent will of democratic majorities within 
different polities. Democratic iterations refer to “complex processes of 
public argument, deliberation, and exchange – through which 
universalist claims are contested and contextualised, invoked and 
revoked, posited and positioned – throughout legal and political 
institutions as well as civil society” (Benhabib, 2008, p. 98).  
Rather than being concerned with the question of which norms are 
valid for human beings across different societies and for all times, 
democratic iterations aim at democratic justice through asking 
questions about what decisions can be reached that would be conceived 
as both just and legitimate within specific polities (Dahl, 1989).  
From the pragmatic approach outlined in Article III, it follows that the 
corporate entity has responsibilities to act on political conversations 
and democratic iterations over ethical values. For Benhabib (2006, 
2008), systems of democratic self-government with free public spaces 
is a basic condition for legitimate processes of democratic iterations. 
Within this framework, the process of public opinion- and will-
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formation takes place among all those who are formal citizens and 
residents of this system, but also among what she refers to as “other 
more fluid and unstructured communities” (Benhabib, 2008, p. 99) 
Such communities may include – and although the state is viewed as 
the principal public actor – international and transnational human rights 
organisations, various UN representatives and monitoring groups, 
global activist groups, compliance-monitoring NGOs, women’s groups, 
church groups, advocacy associations, but also businesses or business 
associations. From a pragmatic approach, also the corporate entity thus 
assumes a role in continues processes of democratic iterations (e.g. 
Nèron and Norman, 2008; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007) necessary for the 
justification of the very principles framing the activity of business in 
the first place.      
The suggested framework does not solve all ethical and practical 
dilemmas and trade-offs that companies will endure. From a pragmatic 
point of view, this is neither possible nor desirable. It is precisely 
ethical and practical dilemmas and trade-offs that constitute the very 
foundation for continued political conversations over ethical values, 
and thus for the legitimacy of some or the other ethical treatise 
constituting the foundation for discussions about the role and 
responsibility of business in society.  
5.5 Analytical Content of Article IV 
Through CSR issue resolution, managers and companies are part of 
societal governance and the authoritative allocation of values and 
resources in society. Issues such as workers’ rights and environmental 
protection are not only economic, legal and social issues, but also have 
a thoroughly political nature, impacting the conditions for citizens’ 
political participation and, ultimately, a thriving democracy and 
societal development (e.g. Dahl, 1989). Building on the assumption that 
managers’ judgements of social issues (in some circumstancesi) impact 
Results 
 95 
individual and organizational level decision-making and activity, 
measuring managers’ orientations or attitudes towards the broad range 
of issues constituting the CSR construct becomes important. Despite 
the centralities of the issue construct in the CSR literature (e.g., 
Blowfield and Murray, 2008) and in the global governance structure 
constituting what Waddock (2008: 87) referred to as the “new 
institutional infrastructure for corporate responsibility”, few scales have 
been developed to measure how managers evaluate social issues. The 
aim of Article IV was thus to develop and validate a measure of 
managers’ orientation towards the broad range of issues constituting the 
CSR construct, cutting across what Carroll (1979) referred to as the 
categories of the construct. Based on a political understanding of the 
corporate entity and the roles and responsibility of the business firm 
and the conceptual approach of corporate citizenship (e.g. Crane et al., 
2008), we hypothesized that CSR issue orientation is a 
multidimensional construct consisting of seven unidimensional 
components: socio-economic development, anti-corruption and bribery, 
environmental protection, working conditions and welfare, supply-
chain responsibility, political participation, and accountability. Our data 
support this hypothesis: the data show that the measures converge on 
common constructs, with satisfactory discriminant and nomological 
validity. On this background, we conclude that the proposed scale for 
measuring managers CSR issues orientation meets standards for 
reliability and validity. However, the development of reliable and valid 
scales may be described as a “never-ending story” (Chen, Cogliser, and 
Vandenberg, 2005). The instrument should hence be tested and 
validated both within other industries and societies.   
                                                 
i See March and Olsen (1979) for a discussion on the limitations of the general theory 
of “the Complete Cycle of Choice”.  
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6 Discussion 
The following discussion attempts to answer the three research 
questions of this thesis, and outline some aspects of a convergent 
institutional perspective on CSR. I begin by discussing the 
institutionally contingent and embedded nature of CSR and how 
institutional theory can contribute to our understanding of national 
manifestations of explicit CSR. I then examine the potential 
institutional and political implications of explicit manifestations of 
CSR. Next – leaving the descriptive inquiry of the two first research 
questions – I address the normative question of the political role and 
responsibility of business in society. Finally, the three interrelated 
inquiries are drawn together within the sketch of a convergent 
institutional theory of CSR.   
6.1 The Institutionally Contingent and Embedded 
Nature of CSR 
Research question 1. How can institutional theory contribute to our 
understanding of the institutional contingent nature of CSR and 
different manifestations of CSR within national-level fields?    
Instrumental and duty-aligned CSR perspectives understand and 
explain manifestations of CSR as the outcome and result of individual 
action, respectively as the outcome of rational self-seeking individuals’ 
pursuit of profit maximisation, and as the outcome of the value 
premises of individual preference-based action. What the literature on 
institutional analysis and this study indicates is that field-level 
manifestations of CSR are institutionally contingent and embedded: 
Aguilera, et al. (2007) identify and discuss government action – both 
enacting laws and enforcing them – as an important factor in 
influencing firms to implement CSR initiatives and thereby becoming 
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agents of social change. Boxenbaum and Gond (2006) describe a 
process of contextualisation (Latour, 1996) as a business CSR practice 
is transferred from one institutional context to another, that is, practices 
are combined with elements in the host society during a transfer. 
Campbell (2007) identifies the following variables as influential in 
determining whether companies will or will not act in a responsible 
way: the balance between public and private regulations, the presence 
of nongovernmental organisations that monitor corporate behaviour, 
the institutionalised norms regarding corporate behaviour, associative 
behaviour among firms themselves, and the degree of organised 
dialogues among corporations and their constituencies. Gjølberg (2009) 
shows how high CSR performance falls together with the existence of 
certain institutional features. Doh and Guay (2006) discuss how 
different institutional structures and political legacies in the US and EU 
are important factors in explaining how governments, NGOs, and the 
broader polity determine and implement preferences regarding CSR. 
Following a similar line of inquiry, Matten and Moon (2005, 2008) 
argue that while the logic of the liberal market can be assumed to 
inform an explicit more than implicit manifestation of CSR, the logic of 
the coordinated market can be assumed to inform a more implicit than 
explicit manifestation of CSR. Others – although not from an explicitly 
institutional theory point of view – have discussed the birth of the 
modern notion of CSR and its basic characteristics with references to 
its cultural and institutional framework (e.g., Article II; Frederick, 
1987, 2006; Hanlon, 2008; Levy and Newell, 2000; Maignan and 
Ralston, 2002; Vogel, 2005). What the literature and studies reviewed 
above indicate is that institutions – whether structural-regulative or 
normative-cognitive (Tempel and Walgenbach (2007) matter, and are 
central to our understanding of CSR, its constitutive principles and 
function of origin, its diffusion – or transformation – from one 
institutional context to another, and its manifestation within a specific 
institutional context.  
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At the same time, some of the current institutional analyses of CSR rely 
on a one-dimensional and over-deterministic account of institutional 
theory that only to a limited degree takes into account recent 
developments in institutional theory that explain how to account for 
heterogeneity, contestation and practice variation, as well as 
homogeneity and consensus within a distinct institutional field. 
Furthermore, through emphasising how a dominant and exclusive 
(Scott, 1994, 2001) institutional logic of the role and responsibility of 
business in society informs consensus around the manifestations of 
CSR within an institutionalised national framework, some of the 
current institutional analysis of CSR ignores the very essence of the 
notion: managerial discretion or agency (e.g., Carroll, 1979; Matten and 
Moon, 2008; Marrewijk, 2003). Consequently, the institutional analysis 
also ignores how actors not only adapt to their institutional context, but 
also often play an active role in shaping those contexts (e.g., DiMaggio, 
1988; Maguire and Hardy, 2006; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Levy and 
Scully 2007; Lounsbury, 2008). 
However, what this study indicates is that the co-existence of multiple 
institutional logics within an institutional field – embedding different 
ideas and practice about at which level to locate responsibility 
mechanisms for social issues – can inform agency and heterogeneity 
and contestation around a manifestation of a social phenomenon. As 
illustrated in Article I, the co-existing logics of the liberal and 
coordinated market within a national institutionalised framework 
inform multiple and contesting institutional models and manifestations 
of CSR; explicit expansionist, explicit contractive, implicit 
expansionist, and implicit contractive CSR. These models differ in 
terms of their basic responsibility mechanism to address social issues, 
and in the scope of issues to which the corporate entity is expected to 
attend. Whereas the model of explicit expansionist CSR assume 
corporate level responsibility mechanisms for a potentially broad range 
of issues beyond the core economic activity of the firm, the model of 
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implicit contractive CSR assumes collective level responsibility 
mechanisms in which the corporate entity is expected to attend to a 
narrow range of social issues. Whereas Article I relates these two 
models to the logic of the liberal and coordinated market (e.g., Hall and 
Soskice, 2001), the model of explicit contractive and implicit 
expansionist CSR can arguably represent hybrids in which the logics of 
liberal and coordinated market are combined, respectively informing a 
model assuming corporate level responsibility strategies for a narrow 
range of social issues (explicit contractive CSR) and collective level 
responsibility mechanisms for a broad range of social issues (implicit 
expansionist CSR).  
This study thus indicates how institutionalised fields often are not only 
constituted by a specific and dominant institutional logic – informing a 
specific manifestation of a social phenomenon like explicit CSR – but 
rather contain multiple and contesting institutional logics. This insight 
is important, as it opens the door for inquiries into how multiple forms 
of institutional rationality (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) can co-exist 
within an institutional field (Lounsbury, 2008). Further, what this study 
also indicates is the role of actors in the interpretation of a new 
managerial convention. Contrary to some of the earlier institutional 
analysis and current institutional analysis of CSR, actors are not 
portrayed as passively responding to one or the other institutional logic. 
Rather, the actors are understood as institutional entrepreneurs 
(DiMaggio, 1988) having an interest in particular manifestations of 
CSR, and invoking different institutional logics in order to make sense 
of the concept and establish a particular model as the appropriate one.           
A perspective on actors as institutional entrepreneurs is not only vital in 
order to understand the translation (Czarniawska and Sevòn, 1996) of a 
new managerial convention or rationalised myth (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977) and the manifestation of this myth within a new institutional 
context. It is also vital to orient the institutional analysis of CSR 
towards the contestation, power-battles and conflicts of interest that 
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arguably spill out within the de-institutionalisation and 
institutionalisation of different institutional logics of the role and 
responsibility of business in society (e.g., Brown, de Jong, and 
Lessidrenska, 2009; Levy, 2008; Levy et al, 2009; Shamir, 2004a; 
2004b). The outcome of such ‘institutional wars’ (Hoffman, 1999)  
(e.g., the actual manifestation of one or the other institutional model of 
CSR) is likely to be the outcome not only of – as indicated in Article I 
– discursive ‘configurations’ (e.g., Maguire and Hardy, 2006; Zilber, 
2002), but also of actors’ organisational, economic, and political 
resources (Levy et al., 2009), factors to which the institutional analysis 
of CSR so far has paid scant attention.  
To conclude this section, the notion and manifestation of CSR are 
indeed institutionally embedded and contingent, but not in the sense of 
actors ‘not having an interest in particular institutional arrangements’, 
and who do not ‘leverage resources to create new institutions or to 
transform existing one’ (Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence, 2004, p. 657). 
On the contrary, different models of CSR build upon different and 
contesting institutional logics about the role and responsibility of 
business in society (Article I), in which agency is located on different 
levels (e.g. Dobbin, 1994). The models thus hold different assumptions 
about the appropriate corporate autonomy and power of business vis-à-
vis political institutions. No wonder then, that CSR becomes a field of 
contention in which business seeks to preserve and strengthen its 
‘hegemony’ over the appropriate meaning of CSR as involving a 
relatively high degree of corporate power in society (e.g., Shamir, 
2004). It is to the potential implication of CSR for the political and 
democratic order I now turn.       
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6.2 Institutional and Democratic Implications of 
Explicit CSR 
Research question 2. What are the potential institutional and political 
implications of explicit manifestations of CSR? 
 
The analysis of and discussions about the impact of manifestations of 
CSR on society is rare, although increasing (e.g., Barely, 2007; Gond, 
Palazzo, and Basu, 2009). At the same time, studies in which CSR has 
functioned as a potential explanans (Van Oosterhout and Heugens, 
2008) of corporate financial performance, have flourished (Margolis 
and Walsh, 2003), resembling the dominant position of instrumental 
and managerial perspectives (e.g., Lockett, Moon, and Visser, 2006) 
within the study field. The argument of this section is that explicit 
expansionist manifestations of CSR (Article I) can bring about and 
entail increased organisational and corporate (political) autonomy in 
society (e.g., Lindblom, 1977; Lowi, 1969; Kariel, 1961; McConnell, 
1966) and thus negatively affect the conditions for a functioning 
democracy (Dahl, 1982, 2000). The discussion in this section takes the 
form of a critical inquiry into the widely held belief that explicit CSR27 
holds the potential to advance some societal good (e.g., Bowen, 1953; 
Davis, 1973; Frederick, 1986; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; 
McWilliams, Siegel, and Wright, 2006)28.  
                                                 
27 In order to discuss the potential institutional and democratic implications of CSR, I 
assume and take an explicit expansionist CSR as the point of departure. As such, I 
assume that the contestation over CSR has resulted in some actors winning the 
‘institutional war’ (Hoffman, 1999) over the appropriate meaning of CSR, resembling 
those actors discursive, organisational, and economic superiority within an 
institutional field.  
28 Concerning the level of analysis, the emphasis is on how organisational level 
manifestations of explicit expansionist CSR can affect societal level (political) 
institutions and governance structures (e.g., Peters, 1997). 
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From the institutional perspective, the societal institution of business 
and corporate entities can be understood as agents or institutional 
entrepreneurs (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988; Clemens and Cook, 1999), that is, 
‘actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and 
who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform 
existing ones’ (Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence, 2004, p. 657), although 
acting within the constraining forces or existing institutions (e.g., 
Olsen, 1988). What the societal institution of business often seek is 
autonomy. Autonomy is often defined as ‘the capacity of an agent to 
determine its own actions and ‘the state of being self-governing’. 
Following Dahl (1982, p. 26), an organisation…   
… is relative autonomous if it undertakes actions that (a) are 
considered harmful by another organization and that (b) no 
other organization, including the government of the state, can 
prevent, or could prevent except by incurring costs so high as 
too exceed the gains to the actor from doing so.  
Autonomy is an inherent aspect of what is means to be a ‘corporate 
entity’ (e.g., Brummer, 1991; Barbara, Dubee, and Galtung, 2009). The 
idea of corporate autonomy – constituting an important aspect of most 
conceptualisations and accounts of CSR (e.g., Carroll, 1979; Wood, 
1991) – also constitutes perhaps the central principle of explicit CSR 
(Shamir, 2004). Marrewijk (2003) refers to the principle of autonomy 
as the principle of self-determination, reflecting the agency of business, 
its relative autonomy, its self-asserting and self-preserving tendencies, 
and the right of business and companies to define their role in a 
situation, and to act according to their own preferences and 
understanding of the world. 
Autonomy – or relative autonomy – cannot reasonably be discussed 
without relating the organisation to which the notion is applied to some 
other entity from which the organisation is argued to be relatively 
autonomous from. Here, I am concerned about the social institution of 
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business’ relative autonomy vis-à-vis political institutions. There is 
little agreement on the meaning of the term ‘politics’ (e.g., Almond, 
1965; Frohock, 1974). It follows, therefore, that ‘political institutions’ 
can be understood in multiple ways. Consistent with the new 
institutional perspective of political science, political institutions can be 
understood as the structural-regulative institutions of the political 
sphere of society (Jones, 1983) – the legislative, executive, juridical, 
administrative, and regulatory branches – and its accompanying 
normative-cognitive taken-for-granted assumptions about the 
appropriate tasks, functioning, role, and responsibility of the political 
sphere of society, including the political control of business in society, 
that is, by which means politics should direct business towards useful 
ends. The notion of political institutions is thus understood somewhat 
narrow, and is analogue to Peters (1997) understanding of 
‘government’, meaning the conventional institutions and processes of 
public policy, and constituting – as stated by Midttun (2004) – the locus 
for legitimate political aggregation of collective interest (Weber, 1947), 
and provider of public services (Baumol, 1967)29.  
Although judgements about harm, costs, and gains are not entirely 
objective or fixed, and since different observers are likely to reach very 
different qualitative judgements about the degrees of autonomy of one 
actor vis-à-vis another (Dahl, 1982) economic organisations arguably 
possess a relative degree of autonomy in society: 
                                                 
29 The societal institution of business and the corporate entity – or civil society 
structures for that matter – is thus not understood as political institutions per se, but 
rather as constituting aspects of the economic institutions of society. That does 
however not mean – as will be indicated in the further discussion – that companies 
and corporate executives do not, at particular times – play a political role in society 
(e.g., through participating in societal governance though not government) or that 
corporate activity does not assume a political nature. 
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Economic organizations, mainly business firms and trade 
unions, are (…) deeply implicated in the problem of autonomy 
and control. Their autonomy is at once a fact, a value, and a 
source of harm. In all democratic countries, business firms make 
important decisions that are not fully controlled by government 
officials (…). Probably no one would deny that their actions are 
sometimes harmful (Dahl, 1982, p. 28).  
Explicit CSR, though building on the idea of discretion, agency, and 
corporate autonomy from political institutions (‘CSR as preferable to 
government regulation’, Frederick, 1987, p. 144) entails a potential for 
preserving, increasing or strengthening the autonomy and power of 
business in society.  
The atomistic nature of explicit CSR (e.g., Carroll, 1979; Marrewijk, 
2003; Matten and Moon, 2005, 2008) can be given an institutional 
explanation through Articles I account of the institutional logic of the 
liberal market informing this manifestation of CSR, and through 
contrasting explicit CSR to its dualistic opposition: the notion of 
implicit CSR, and the institutional logic of the coordinated market 
constituting this particular model of CSR. As argued in Article I, 
although the model of the liberal and the coordinated market share 
some basic assumptions about what should be valued in society, e.g., 
democracy and welfare (Matten and Moon, 2008), the models differ 
considerably in how what is valued should be addressed and governed. 
That is, the logic differs in the level at which to locate agency (e.g., 
Dobbin, 1994) and how to construct governance structures:  
Where the logic of collective responsibility embedded in the 
model of the coordinated market in general prescribes 
rulemaking and rule following as the appropriate strategy, and 
hence defines a role for obligatory agency and associated actors, 
the logic of corporate responsibility embedded in the model of 
the liberal market in general envisages a greater role for isolated 
Discussion 
 105 
corporate initiatives and discretionary agency to address such 
issues. As a result, within the model of explicit CSR, the 
responsibility mechanisms are more corporate than collective in 
nature: the corporate entity – through voluntary corporate 
policies and programmes – assumes a direct organisational-level 
responsibility for various social issues. Within the model of 
implicit CSR, on the other hand, the responsibility mechanisms 
for obtaining what is valued is more collective than corporate in 
nature: the corporate entity, as a member of the societal 
institution of business – through values, norms and rules – 
assumes an indirect responsibility for various social issues, 
together with the other major institutions of society (Article I, 
pp. 179-180).  
So, where the logic of the liberal market locates agency at the corporate 
level, the logic of the coordinated market locates agency at the 
collective level, that is, within what Matten and Moon (2008, p. 409) 
refer to as the ‘wider formal and informal institutions for society’s 
interests and concerns’. That means that the logic of the liberal and 
coordinated marked differ considerably in the degree of autonomy that 
they envisage or grant business and the corporate entity. Within the 
logic of the liberal market, the corporate actor is granted a relatively 
higher degree of autonomy vis-à-vis collective actors – including 
political institutions – in addressing social issues than what the logic of 
the coordinated market grant the very same actor. The model of explicit 
CSR thus constitutes one aspect of a model of societal governance 
(Peters, 1997) in which the atomistic nature of the market is understood 
to be superior to socially embedded markets (Granovetter, 1985) in 
order to achieve what is valued in society: democracy and welfare. This 
can also be accounted for as a difference in the balance between control 
and autonomy (Dahl, 1982) and between the models of the liberal and 
coordinated market. Where the model of explicit CSR represents and is 
the logical outcome of an institutional logic emphasising a relatively 
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low degree of social control over business and a relatively high degree 
of business autonomy, the model of implicit CSR represents and is the 
logical outcome of an institutional logic emphasising a relatively high 
degree of social control over business and a relatively low degree of 
business autonomy. Jones (1983) describe the very same phenomenon 
as a difference between models of social control, in which explicit CSR 
represents a model of ‘self-control’, and hence a relatively high degree 
of corporate autonomy, that can be distinguished from other social 
control mechanisms – e.g., regulation, industrial policy, national 
economic planning – potentially reducing the autonomy of business in 
society. In short, while the logic of the liberal market contains 
institutions encouraging individualism more than collectivism, 
discretionary more than obligatory agency, policies providing 
discretion more than obligation, and isolated more than associated 
actors, the logic of the coordinated market contains institutions 
reversing that order: institutions encouraging collectivism more than 
individualism, obligatory more than discretionary agency, policies 
providing obligation more than discretion, and associated more than 
isolated actors (Matten and Moon, 2008).  
Based on the argument so far, explicit manifestations of CSR entail a 
higher degree of business and corporate autonomy vis-à-vis political 
institutions than its opposite, implicit CSR. If this indeed is the case, 
then explicit manifestations of CSR also hold the potential for affecting 
the very institutions that informed the initial manifestation of CSR. 
Autonomous organisations – like businesses and business associations 
– are a result of democratic-liberal politics. From a democratic point of 
view, autonomous organisations are important as a counterforce to the 
coercive power of the state (Dahl, 1982). At the same time – as 
emphasised by writers as Lindblom (1977), Lowi (1969), Kariel 
(1961), and McConnell (1966) – autonomous organisations – especially 
business organisations – can undermine the principles of democratic 
government. Dahl (1982) discusses four ways in which autonomy may 
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weaken the institutions and functioning of pluralist democracy: by 
stabilising political inequalities, by deforming the civic consciousness, 
by distorting the public agenda, and by alienating final control. As 
explained by Pollack (1983-84, pp. 92-93) 
Representation through groups means that inequalities related to 
organizational strengths are translated into political inequalities. 
The internal structure of organization is oligarchical; hence 
representation is further distorted. Finally different groups exert 
unequal influence because of the intrinsic inequality of different 
economic roles.     
A growing body of literature has explored the potentially troublesome 
effects of CSR and increased corporate autonomy for political 
institutions and democracy. Frederick (1987, 2006) argues that the 
modern notion of CSR evolved within the business sphere of society 
itself as a response to a ‘hostile‘ institutional environment seeking to 
reduce the autonomy and power of business in society through public 
criticism and governmental regulation. Sadler and Lloyd (2009) situate 
the rise of explicit CSR in the context of a re-casting of the boundaries 
between state- and corporate-centred regulations, and in which CSR 
constitutes an aspect of corporate-based social control, and hence as an 
expression of increased corporate power and autonomy of business. In 
a similar manner, other scholars (e.g., Henderson, 2001; Waddock, 
2004b; Moon, 2005; Moon and Richardson, 1985) in the study field of 
business and society have asserted that the rise and revival of explicit 
CSR thinking since the 1970s can be understood in the same way as 
when the notion first emerged in the U.S. business community in the 
early twentieth century: as a notion functioning partly as an idea 
protecting the interests of business and preserving and strengthening 
the autonomy of companies vis-à-vis political institutions and the 
interests of civil society.  
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Barley (2007, p. 201) argues that the shift ‘to an organizational or, 
better yet, a corporate society’ has placed representative democracy in 
jeopardy. Barley (2007) illustrates three ways in which corporations 
affects their environment by undermining representative democracy 
and the public good; by promoting legislation that benefits corporations 
at the expense of individual citizens, by gaining control of the agencies 
that were intended to regulate them, and by privatising the functions 
that have historically been the mandate of local and state authorities 
and governments. I have argued (Article II) that explicit CSR can 
undermine what he calls the institutional condition for sustainable 
development, by allowing increased power to business in society within 
a new model of societal governance, by warding off public criticism 
and governmental regulation, and by “mystifying” the essential 
capitalist forces that drive business activity.    
In discussing the political economy of explicit CSR, Banarjee (2008) 
explains how companies, as one of several groups of powerful actors in 
institutional fields, domains, or organised spaces (Bourdieu, 1977; 
DiMaggio, 1985; Scott, 1995) attempt to produce a system of 
domination. Jones (1996) argues that the paternalistic stewardship 
principle behind explicit CSR in its full context legitimates the 
hierarchical domination of business in society rather than encourages 
democratic pluralism. Sahlin-Andersson (2006, p. 603 ) argues that just 
as explicit CSR builds on the strength and power, that is, autonomy, of 
business in society, explicit CSR may reinforce this power and ‘add to 
a transfer of responsibilities and resources from states and civil society 
to corporations’. Shamir (2004a) shows how CSR is interpreted and 
given a meaning that is amenable to business rather than to society, and 
claims that explicit CSR prevents the use of law as means if bringing 
about greater corporate accountability. Finally, Levy (2008) identifies 
global production networks – in which notions of explicit CSR are 
included – as integrated economic, political, and discursive systems in 
which market and political power are intertwined.  
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From an institutional point of view, future researchers should make 
inquiries into if and exactly how this may come about: does explicit 
CSR help to stabilise political inequalities, and if it does, how, in what 
sorts of situations, and with what consequences? Does explicit CSR 
deform the civic consciousness, and if so, how, in what sorts of 
situations, and with what consequences? Does explicit CSR distort the 
public agenda, and if so, how, in what sorts of situations, and with what 
consequences? Finally, does explicit CSR alienate final control, and if 
so, how, in what sorts of situations, and with what consequences?   
6.3 Towards a Political Conceptualisation of CSR 
Research question 3. How can institutional theory contribute to 
discussions of a justified foundation for companies’ efforts in the 
societal arena?  
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that explicit CSR can undermine the 
institutions constituting the very foundations of a democratic political 
order. It therefore follows that we should be concerned with the 
normative question of what the institutional and political responsibility 
of business in society is. From an institutional point of view, 
justification of the political responsibility of business in society is not 
sought on economic or instrumental grounds (‘business should be 
socially responsible because companies can do well by doing well’). 
Nor is it sought solely on moral grounds (‘business should be socially 
responsible because it is the right thing to do’). Rather, justification is 
sought on political grounds (e.g., Article III; Davis, 1960; Scherer and 
Palazzo, 2007)30, and the idea of the primacy of politics and democracy 
                                                 
30 See also Matten and Crane’s (2005) discussion of the political role of companies as 
a foundation for an extended conceptualisation of corporate citizenship. Note 
however, that their analysis has no normative ambitions, that is, they are not seeking a 
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over philosophy (Crick, 1962; Habermas, 1996; Rorty, 1991). It does 
not start with philosophical principles but with an analysis of the 
changing interplay of governments, civil society actors, and 
corporations, and the potential institutional consequences of that 
interplay (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007).   
Stern and Barley (1996) argues that organisations – including business 
organisations – not only have become prominent actors in society, but 
that they also may have become the only kind of actor with significant 
cultural and political influence. Although the latter certainly is an 
overstatement regarding business organisations, the societal institution 
of business and companies certainly wields inordinate political power 
(e.g., Lindblom, 1977; Dahl, 1982; Wilson, 2003). An important aspect 
of the explicit expansionist manifestation of CSR is what can be 
referred to as the politicisation of, and the political role of business in 
society and the corporate entity.  
Within the business and society field, the assumption of the political 
role of the corporate entity itself, and the political nature of the 
activities companies rubric under the banner of CSR, is a highly 
contested one (e.g., Matten, 2009; Scherer, Palazzo, and Matten, 2009; 
Van Oosterhout and Heugens, 2008). However, a small, but steadily 
growing body of literature now discusses and is going in the direction 
of  acknowledging the political nature of the corporate entity and of 
CSR activities (e.g., Article III; Banarjee, 2008; Barley, 2007; Crane, 
Matten and Moon, 2008; Dubbink, 2004; Levy, 2008; Norman and 
Nèron, 2008; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007, 2008). This is also reflected 
through the growing body of literature explicitly conceptualising and 
identifying dimensions of CSR from political theories of citizenship 
                                                                                                                    
(political) justification for the political roles that business is evidently assuming in 
society.    
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(e.g., Article IV; Crane, Matten, and Moon, 2008; Nèron and Norman, 
2008). 
Business assumes a political nature and roles in multiple ways. This 
may happen as  
- the corporate entity – from its position within the economic sphere 
of society – exposes itself to activities being the functioning of 
political institutions (Almond, 1965), when 
- business believes that its interest will be affected by the decisions 
taken by political institutions – representing an arrangement of 
power and authority, and having the authority and legitimacy to 
make decisions that are applicable to the whole community – and 
this awareness takes the form of action directed towards political 
institutions (Wolin, 2004), when  
- business take part in political discourses (e.g., Levy et al., 2009; 
Scherer and Palazzo, 2007), e.g., about the appropriate meaning and 
social control mechanisms of CSR (Shamir, 2004), when 
- business assumes a role within jurisgenerative politics and 
democratic iterations (Article III), when 
- companies assume a responsibility for issues earlier within the 
responsibility of political institutions and the state (e.g., Matten and 
Crane, 2005; Moon, 2005), as health care, basic shelter, education, 
telecommunication, public transport, water and electricity (Scherer, 
Palazzo, and Matten, 2009), when 
- business and companies become involved in the administration and 
provision of civil, social, and political rights (Crane, Matten , and 
Moon, 2008), when 
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- firms pursue political objectives in their technical standardisation 
practices (Frankel and Højbjerg, 2009),  and when  
- business and companies take part in constituting and 
institutionalising the very same regulations and standards that they 
are supposed to obey (e.g., Hirschland, 2006; Levy, et al., 2009).  
The arguably multiple ways in which business and companies assume 
political roles in society, the potential institutional and political 
implications of these roles, and companies’ expanded responsibility in 
society, begs the normative question of what the political responsibility 
of business should be. This question is scarcely discussed within the 
study field of business and society31. Van Oosterhout and Heugens 
(forthcoming) state that institutional theory is theoretically 
underdeveloped for justificatory purposes. In contrast, the position 
taken in this thesis is that new institutional theory of political science 
(March and Olsen, 1984, 1989, 1996) holds some promise for framing 
and informing discussions of the political and institutional role and 
responsibility of business in society, and to indicate what this 
responsibility might be. I will make no effort to arrive at specific 
solutions to the problem of the role and responsibility of business in 
society. Specific and satisfactory solutions can only be found in the 
special characteristics and predicaments of the context. At the same 
time, no specific solution is likely to be satisfactory unless it is 
                                                 
31 Business and companies’ political responsibility is rarely mentioned in 
international CSR standards and guidelines. The forthcoming ISO 2600 is perhaps the 
standard/guideline that goes to the greatest lengths in acknowledging the political 
nature of the firm and CSR.  Among other things, it states that organisations should 
prohibit use of undue influence and avoid behaviour, such as manipulation, 
intimidation and coercion that can undermine the public political process.  
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informed by some guiding principles and ideas (Dahl, 1982), and some 
guiding principles can be derived from institutional theory.  
The new institutionalism of political science (e.g., Olsen, 2009) takes 
seriously the vision of the “old” institutionalism (e.g., Wilson, 1989; 
Burgess, 1902) of a political order based upon institutions (Wolin, 
1960, 2004). Political democracy depends not only on economic and 
social conditions, but also on the design and appropriate functioning of 
political institutions (March and Olsen, 1984). An institution is ‘infused 
with values beyond its technical requirements’ (Selznick, 1957, p. 17), 
and embedding ethical principles about the common good. These 
values in turn – constituting a key element of institutional logics 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2004) – are assumed to 
influence an individual’s worldviews, sensemaking, perceptions, and 
ultimately his or her behaviour. For this reason, new institutional theory 
sees corporate social responsibility and the pursuit of the common good 
not so much as personal values – as within some duty aligned and 
ethical CSR perspectives (e.g., Swanson, 1995, 1999) – but rather a 
constitutive part of institutionally informed identities.  
The institutional normative perspective, first, reflects a value from 
which to judge and evaluate the activities of business and its CSR 
‘performance’, including the political roles assumed by business. For 
example, does companies’ enlarged responsibility in their globally 
expanded business environment – responsibilities once regarded as 
purely governmental (Walsh, Weber, and Margolis, 2003) – undermine 
the design of global democratic and political institutions (e.g., Article 
II), institutions that within the nation state historically has ‘comprised 
the free market’s indispensable context’ (Barber, 2000, p. 275)? Does 
companies’ engagement in health, education, and protection of human 
rights in countries with repressive regimes (Kinley and Tadaki, 2004; 
Matten and Crane, 2005) strengthen or weaken countries without the 
‘institutional prerequisites for CSR’s’ (Matten and Moon, 2008, p. 406) 
capacity for building their own political institutions for dealing with 
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these issues? Does business and companies’ engagement in self-
regulation (Scherer and Smid, 2000) jeopardise national and 
international collective and legally binding initiatives (e.g., Barley, 
2007)?     
Second, an institutional normative perspective on CSR draws attention 
to the political and institutional conditions (Campbell, 2007) of 
responsible business conduct, and thus to ways of promoting 
responsible business behaviour. In contrast to the prevailing 
instrumental and duty-aligned CSR perspectives (Gond, et al., 2009), 
that means that the focus shifts from constructing  ‘the business case 
for CSR’ and rational self-seeking individuals, and from  discussions 
about the moral principles that should inform corporate managers and 
organisational members within their ‘room of discretion’, to 
discussions about the institutions framing and regulating the activity of 
business (e.g., Vogel, 2009), and the values and institutional logics that 
should constitute these institutions. 
Third, and finally, an institutional perspective directs attention to the 
responsibility of business and companies in not undermining the 
institutional conditions for an appropriate political order and 
functioning democracy, and possibly for assuming coresponsibility for 
enhancing the political institutional conditions for democracy (e.g., 
Dobers and Halme, 2009). The premise of the political and institutional 
responsibility of business is the recognition of a need for what Scherer 
and Palazzo (2007: 1097) have called ‘a political order where economic 
rationality is circumscribed by democratic institutions and procedures’, 
and for business’s role in contributing to sustaining or building this 
order. As such, there are two possible aspects of the institutional and 
political responsibility of business (Article II): 1) complying with 
national, international, and transnational laws, and what Waddock 
(2008) calls “the new institutional infrastructure for corporate 
responsibility”, which includes CSR initiatives promoted by civil 
society institutions, states, and the business community itself, and 2) 
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enhancing and promoting collective responsibility mechanisms and the 
capacity for political and civil society institutions to perform their 
foundational tasks in society, including the capacity of political 
institutions to circumscribe economic rationality by democratic 
institutions and procedures (e.g., Dobers and Halme, 2009; Vogel, 
2005)32. 
Based on Campbell’s (2007) discussion of the institutional variables 
that promote responsible business behaviour, it is possible to point to 
four areas in which companies may contribute to the function of 
collective responsibility mechanisms through organisational strategies 
and procedures: 1) institutionalising dialogues with unions, employees, 
and other stakeholders, 2) developing the capacity of trade and 
employer associations to address social issues, 3) contributing to 
effective industrial self-regulation, and 4) developing national and 
international regulative frameworks.  
A fully developed normative theory is (from a pragmatic point of view) 
not possible – or should not be developed – without investigations and 
descriptive analysis of the extended and political roles that companies 
are playing in society, and about the societal and institutional 
consequences of these roles. A new institutional perspective indicates a 
normative orientation, but can not on its own deliver a full-blown 
normative theory of the political role and responsibility of business in 
society. It must be complemented and developed based on descriptive 
inquiry into the implications of corporate political activities. The 
institutional perspective on CSR suggested here, thus has some marks 
of the pragmatic approach to CSR suggested by Margolis and Walsh 
(2003): an approach where a descriptive research agenda lays the 
                                                 
32 More radical implications can also be outlined. See for example Söderbaum’s 
(2009) discussion about alternatives to the ideological orientation and institutional 
structures of the ‘mainstream’ neo-liberal logic of sustainable development and CSR.  
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foundation for normative theoretical development. However, in contrast 
to Margolis and Walsh (2003) the normative theory development is not 
solely inductive. The contribution to the institutional perspective – on 
the normative level – is that it indicates a key value – the importance of 
political institutions for achieving the common good – both informing 
our key descriptive research questions of interest (how expanded 
notions of CSR and corporate political activities impact the very 
political institutions that frame and regulate business activity), and 
constituting a foundation upon which to evaluate and judge the 
outcome of firms’ CSR practices. As such, the normative CSR theory 
building that can be outlined from an institutional perspective is neither 
one of (only) deduction, in which some philosophical principles inform 
a complete theory of action. Nor is it one of (only) induction, in which 
some competing principles are clarified and explored. Rather, it is one 
of abduction (Danermark, et al., 1997), in which the philosophical 
principles embedded in institutional theory informs a direction from 
which to conduct descriptive research and that the results of companies 
CSR activities can be evaluated upon, evaluations that will – over time 
– illuminate some possible course of action. As such, the perspective is 
one of pragmatism (Article III) in which the ultimate justification of the 
political role and responsibility of business in society does not solely 
rest with some philosophical principle, but with political conversations 
upon such principles informed by the contemporary role and 
responsibility business currently are assuming in society (as revealed 
by descriptive research), and what causes the manifestations of these 
roles. 
The above sketch of an alternative for identifying the political role and 
responsibility of business in society contributes to an increased interest 
for political conceptualisations of CSR in the academic business and 
society literature (e.g., Vogel, 2005; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007; Nèron 
and Norman, 2008). From an institutional point of view, a political 
conceptualisation of CSR does not necessarily involve identifying the 
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corporate entity as a political organisation. Rather, a political 
conceptualisation of CSR is above all an acknowledgement of the need 
for a political framing of the economic activity of business in order to 
realise such important values as democracy, a functioning capitalism 
and welfare, and for business responsibility not to interfere improperly 
in processes of public policy, but rather to sustain and develop 
collective rather than corporate level responsibility mechanisms. 
This conceptualisation of the political responsibility of the business 
firm diverges in some respects from the notion of political CSR and 
embedded political responsibility suggested by Scherer and Palazzo 
(2007, 2008). From a Habermasian position, they seem to suggest that 
companies and business should engage and assume political roles and 
enlarged responsibility in society, and that political coresponsibility can 
lead to an improved contextual sensitivity of the embedded corporation 
in comparison with “just-in-time” tactical responses. Building on the 
premises of the need for genuine political institutions for informing and 
bringing about responsible business, an institutional perspective would 
critically evaluate business political roles and activities upon its impact 
on the institutions constituting a basis for a political order and 
democracy to exist. Given the potential negative impact of explicit 
expansionist CSR – embedding an enlarged and political responsibility 
of the business firm – on society and political institutions (e.g., Barley, 
2007; Shamir, 2004a, 2004b), an institutional perspective would be 
critical about business assuming expanded roles and responsibilities in 
society.  
6.4 Towards an Convergent Institutional 
Perspective on CSR 
The first descriptive inquiry of this thesis described the potential effects 
of and implications of (political) institutions and logics on national 
manifestations of CSR. In the second descriptive inquiry, attention was 
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directed to the potential effects or implications of explicit expansionist 
corporate level manifestation of CSR on the political institutions 
framing and informing specific manifestations of CSR in the first place, 
including the political institutions of modern pluralist democracies. In 
the normative inquiry of this thesis, the focus was on the possible 
justification of a political conceptualisation of CSR from an 
institutional point of view. Building on these insights, the discussion 
can be drawn together in a sketch of a convergent institutional 
perspective of CSR33, a perspective with the following characteristics: 
1. There are some institutional prerequisites for CSR (Matten and 
Moon, 2008), constituting the theory’s boundary conditions 
(Bacharach, 1989). There are functioning markets in which 
corporations has a certain degree of discretion over their responses 
to market, social, or political drivers. Second, there are functioning 
governmental and legal institutions that guarantee, define, and 
administer the market and act on behalf of society to address the 
common good. Third, these institutions neither capture nor are 
captured by market actors. Fourth, there is a civil society that 
institutionalises and articulates social values and preferences, to 
which government and market actors respond. 
2. The theory does not depend on any specific behavioural 
assumptions (Jones and Wicks, 1999). It assumes that a) human 
behaviour is both varied (e.g., self-interested, trusting, and 
cooperative) and variable (e.g., sometimes self-interested, trusting, 
and cooperative), and b) that human behaviour is malleable but 
often depends on context (e.g. institutional) and circumstances.   
                                                 
33 The outline of a possible convergent institutional theory draws on Jones’ and 
Wick’s (1999) discussion and outline of a convergent stakeholder theory.  
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3. The theory is inherently descriptive. It directs attention towards the 
institutional contingent nature of CSR, and is thus interested in 
understanding and explaining how different institutional logics can 
inform specific manifestations of CSR, and how manifestations of 
CSR (embedding elements of agency and institutional 
entrepreneurship) affect the very same institutional logics, and with 
what consequences.  
4. The theory is inherently normative. It pays attention to specific 
lines of descriptive inquiry (e.g., the impact of expanded corporate 
responsibility on the political institutions framing and regulating the 
activity of business). Further, it indicates some values (e.g., the 
vision of a political order based upon institutions) upon which to 
judge the appropriateness of companies CSR activities and their 
institutional impacts and implications, and from which to discuss a 
justification of the institutional and political responsibility of 
business in society.    
5. The theory is simultaneously normative and descriptive/empirical.  
6.5 Implications for the Institutional Analysis of 
CSR   
The sketch of a convergent institutional theory on CSR has several 
implications for future research and the institutional analysis of CSR. 
The perspective informs research directed by the aim of making 
inquiries into the institutionally contingent nature of CSR and the 
implications and effects of different manifestations of CSR upon the 
institutional and political order of pluralist democracies, and thus upon 
human welfare (e.g., Walsh, Meyer, and Schoonhoven, 2006), and the 
appropriate role and responsibility of business in society. Differently 
put, there is a need for research that is simultaneously descriptive and 
normative.   
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6.5.1 Understanding Manifestations of CSR 
Following the first descriptive orientation of a convergent institutional 
theory of CSR, future research should study the further 
institutionalisation of CSR manifestations – whether explicit, implicit, 
or hybrid (Boxenbaum (2006) in nature – within different institutional 
contexts, and how we can understand these manifestations. For 
example, what is the actual balance of explicit and implicit CSR 
strategies within industries and companies? What responsibility 
strategies do companies use? How do they address various social 
issues? What are the actual outcomes of these strategies? 
The institutional literature on CSR indicates that – in a number of 
coordinated market economies – traditional ideas about the 
appropriateness of collective level mechanisms in which the firm 
attends to a narrow range of social issues are being challenged and 
contested by more explicit thinking of CSR, where corporate discretion 
plays an important role. This raises several intriguing questions. A first 
set of questions that arises is the exact nature and content of the 
expanded – and often political – roles business and companies assumes 
in society (Matten, 2009). For example, what elements in contemporary 
corporate behaviour are we talking about when we allude to a political 
role of the corporation? How do companies influence the political 
process?  
A second set of questions that arises is how we can account for and 
understand the institutionally contingent and embedded nature of CSR 
and different manifestations of CSR. We are only beginning to 
understand how institutional variables do inform manifestations of 
CSR, and how these intervene with economic variables (e.g., Campbell, 
2007), personal values, and motives (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2007). 
Further research could reveal how variations in the institutional context 
affect the ways business conduct CSR, and why firms favour unilateral 
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CSR initiatives to collective CSR codes and responsibility mechanisms 
(Griffin and Prakash, 2010).      
6.5.2 Understanding Societal Implications of 
Manifestations of CSR 
Following the second descriptive orientation of a convergent 
institutional theory of CSR, future researchers should study the 
institutional, political, and societal implications and effects of different 
manifestations of CSR (e.g., Gond et al., 2009). How does the eventual 
increase in the use of explicit CSR strategies affect the national 
business system, the nature of the firm, the nature of the market 
organisation, and internal coordination and control? How do explicit 
CSR strategies affect established and collective arrangements that 
address issues of work life and of environmental protection? How do 
corporations influence their institutional framework? What are the 
effects of explicit CSR on implicit norms for organising the business-
society? What are the effects of corporations on the quality of 
democratic decision making? What problems are caused by corporate 
political strategies and political lobbying? What are the consequences 
of a political conception of corporate social responsibility for corporate 
governance and the economic theory of the firm? Does business 
participation in public policy stabilise political inequalities? Does 
business participation in public policy distort the public agenda? Does 
business participation in public policy alienate final control34? These 
are urgent questions in the business and society study field. As Vogel 
(2005, 171) explains:  
…the most critical dimension of corporate responsibility may 
well be a company’s impact on public policy. A company’s 
                                                 
34 The three latter questions are based on Dahl (1982). 
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political activities typically have far broader consequences than 
its own practices. Yet relatively few demands raised by activists 
or social investors have addressed business-government 
relations. Too many discussions of CSR, especially in the 
business community, ignore the importance of government.  
6.5.3 Justifying the Role and Responsibility of 
Business 
Following the normative orientation on a convergent institutional 
theory of CSR, future research should discuss the appropriate role and 
responsibility of business in society. Important questions would be 
(Scherer, Palazzo, and Matten, 2009): Do companies have a political 
responsibility, and, if so, how can it be defined? How can we find a 
balance between corporate power and the public interest? How can the 
activities of companies be democratically controlled? Further inquiries 
into the political role and responsibility of business are of great 
importance in order to understand the effectiveness of the different 
‘means by which society directs business activity to useful ends’ 
(Jones, 1983, p. 560), and the role of corporations in influencing these 
means.  
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                                 “I have come to the view that voluntary social responsibility               
cannot be relied upon as a significant form of control over business. The power of 
business overwhelms the weak reed of voluntary social responsibility. My experience 
and observation since (1953) have led me to the conclusion that the social 
responsibility concept is of minimal effectiveness” (Howard Bowen35, cited in 
Frederick, 2006, p. 10) 
If indeed the international market place is crucial for the economic well-being of 
countries and their people, then there is a real need for government to exert as much 
control as possible over those markets (Peters, 1997, p. 54)    
7 Conclusions (As if Society 
Mattered...) 
The first descriptive inquiry of this thesis is an attempt to answer an 
appeal within organisation science and the business and society 
literature for treating CSR as explanandum and not only explanans 
(Van Oosterhout and Heugens, 2008). The second descriptive inquiry 
of this thesis is an attempt to answer a call within organisation science 
and the business and society literature for a study of how organisations 
(and especially business organisations) influence and shape their 
environment and human welfare (Barley, 2007; Margolis and Walsh, 
2003; Walsh, Meyer, and Schoonhoven, 2006). The normative inquiry 
of this thesis responds to the need in the business and society literature 
for more politically rooted conceptualisations and justifications of CSR 
(e.g., Vogel, 2005; Scherer, Palazzo, and Matten, 2009) In sum, this 
thesis offers possible building blocks of a convergent institutional 
theory of CSR, thus responding to the need in organisation science and 
                                                 
35 Howard Bowen is recognised as the “founding father” of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (Carroll, 1999). In 1953, he published The Social Responsibility of the 
Business Man, in which he defined CSR as    
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business and society literature for convergent perspectives in which 
descriptive and normative analyses are combined or integrated (Jones 
and Wicks, 1999; Kochan, Guillen, Hunter, and O’Mahoney, 2009; 
Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Matten, 2009). It matters whether an issue 
is defined as technical, economic, legal, moral, or political (Nelken, 
1993). Situating the notion of CSR within the theoretical framework of 
the new institutionalism of political science opens the door to inquiring 
into the institutionally contingent nature of the construct and its 
manifestations, for discussing the potential outcome or implications of 
organisational level manifestations of CSR for society, and for 
discussing what is and is not the appropriate role and responsibility of 
business in society. Attention is thus drawn from the inward and self-
centred corporate emphasis of instrumental – and sometimes ethical – 
perspectives seeking to establish ‘the business case’ for CSR by 
revealing a positive correlation between CSR and corporate financial 
performance, discourses often wrapped up in win-win scenarios in 
which both the corporate entities and society are portrayed as better off 
by adhering to the logic of rational self-seeking individuals and profit 
maximisation, and to questions of the interests, power, and politics of 
CSR.    
7.1 Limitations with the Study 
Given the theoretical more than empirical and policy orientated nature 
of this study, this section will dwell with some limitations concerning 
the use of the new institutional perspective to frame descriptive and 
normative CSR analysis.  
The Institutional Contingent Nature of CSR. This study has used new 
institutionalism to frame discussions about the institutional contingent 
nature of CSR, but contingent on what institutions; structural-
regulative; normative-cognitive, or both? In addition, how are we to 
precisely describe these institutions, and when do we know they exists 
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(Peters, 1996)? This study has build on the notion of institutional logic 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2004) in order to discuss acts of 
agency through the interpretation and manifestation of different models 
of CSR. The notion of logic refers both to structural-regulative and 
normative-cognitive features of institution, as well as practice. It is thus 
not very clear what the institution – or institutional logics – is, and how 
they are separable from other societal structures. In addition, there is 
the problem of not treating the logics as independent and dependent 
variables simultaneously (Pedersen, 1991): what constitute the 
institutional logics both constitute the frames from which 
manifestations of CSR is argued to arise, as well as the manifestations 
itself from which we study the development of new practices. The 
problem of the imprecise definition of an institution is closely related to 
what Peters (1996, p. 215) describe as the tautology problem: “If the 
rules that shape behaviour are expanded to include implicit rules and 
vague understandings, in order to cover instances in which observed 
behaviours do not correspond to the formal rules of an institution, than 
the theory may not be falsifiable”. In one way the inclusion of 
conflicting institutional logics within a distinct institutional field can 
amplify this problem in institutional analysis. At the same time, the 
social constructivism of new institutional theory is seldom about what 
is falsifiable or not in a strict positivistic sense. Rather, it is about 
arriving at some plausible interpretation of a social phenomenon. Other 
interpretation may also be “true” without that reducing the power of the 
perspective from which some empirical and/or theoretical perspectives 
and notions are related to as part of the analysis.     
Justification of CSR. Although the new institutionalism represents a 
renewed interest for bringing normative political theory into 
institutional analysis, the perspective can be criticised for not providing 
a thorough discussion and reflections about the normative principles 
supporting the formal structural-regulative institutions of political life. 
This hampers the use of the perspective for justificatory purposes. We 
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are somehow left with the recognition that companies CSR efforts 
should not undermine the institutions on which the political order and 
democracy exists, and that business somehow has a responsibility to 
respect and support the collective institutions framing the activity of 
business. Although this is an important recognition – and one that flies 
in the face of many instrumental and ethical CSR perspectives – it is, 
from a normative point of view, somewhat unsatisfactory to not being 
able to proceed with a closer discussion about the institutional change 
and reform that could foster responsible business conduct. At the same 
time, the strength of a convergent institutional perspective, is that what 
is and what is not the appropriate role and responsibility of business in 
society, is not something that only could (or should) be outlined from 
some normative principles, but rather something that manifest itself 
through processes of democratic iterations upon the role business in 
fact is playing in society as evident from descriptive and empirical 
illumination. In addition, a convergent institutional perspective does 
not rule out the possibility of integrating other normative principles in 
the analysis of the appropriate role and responsibility of business in 
society (e.g., Van Oosterhout and Heugens, 2009).   
Discussing justification of CSR from an institutional point of view, 
another problem is of course the capacity of individuals, groups, or 
other institutions to design institutions in a manner which will produce 
the desired outcomes (Peters, 1996), e.g., responsible business conduct. 
In addition, the conscious design of institutions often produces no 
discernible outcomes, or even the opposite of the intended ones. So, 
although institutionalist has knowledge about the institutional features 
informing responsible business conduct within the frame of the nation 
state – e.g., institutionalised tripartite dialogue, regulative frameworks 
and voluntary agreements – there are question about both the capacity 
of the design of such institutions at the international level, and about 
their potential implications for CSR on a global scale. 
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New institutionalism and other institutionalisms. In some respect, the 
application of the new institutionalism in this study can be portrayed as 
a paradox: At the one hand it is argued that the perspective is well 
suited to make inquiries into the questions at hand. At the same time, 
the analysis draws heavily on other institutionalisms – most importantly 
the neo-institutionalism of sociology and organisational analysis (e.g., 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Lounsbury, 
2008) – in order to make inquiries into the institutional contingent 
nature of CSR and its potential institutional and political implications. 
Although this design resemble the aim of contributing to a convergent 
perspective in which new institutionalism constitute a possible frame 
for the application of also other theoretical perspectives, the paradox 
begs analysis in which the new institutional perspective is applied more 
thoughtfully on the societal institution of business, and not just to frame 
discussions about the relationship between political institutions and 
business in which other institutionalisms constitutes the bulk of the 
theory and the foundation for the analysis36.                
7.2 Final Remarks 
A key argument of this thesis has been that explicit expansionist 
manifestations of CSR hold the potential to undermine the political 
institutions of liberal pluralist democracies. The model of explicit 
expansionist CSR has spread beyond its birthplace to other parts of the 
world. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that this model of CSR is as a 
legitimate model of societal governance within liberal pluralist 
democracies. Looking, for example, at emerging public policy on CSR 
in Europe, several governments – and indeed EU– have accepted the 
                                                 
36 Such an approach would however also come with its own problems, perhaps most 
importantly that of conceptual stretching (Sartori, 1970), but see discussion in chapter 
4.3.1 “Selection of Theoretical Perspective”. 
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basic ideas of explicit expansionist CSR (Albareda, Lozano, and Ysa, 
2007): the notion of corporate level responsibility mechanisms for a 
broad range of social issues. Moreover, the model is not only accepted, 
but also promoted in public policy in order to inform, support, and 
improve businesses CSR practices.  
At the same time, public policy on CSR in European countries seems to 
be moving toward the establishment of a distinction between what 
companies should do at home, that is, within the institutional pre-
requisites for CSR in European countries (Matten and Moon, 2008), 
and what companies should do in developing countries lacking the 
same type of institutional pre-requisites for CSR that we find in most 
European liberal democracies. As such, public policy on CSR (e.g., the 
Norwegian White Paper on CSR37) often suggests that companies 
assume corporate responsibility and develop organisational 
responsibility mechanisms for a broad range of social issues for which 
European states still bear the prime responsibility. At home, public 
policy on CSR often suggests practices more associated with the model 
of explicit contractive and models of implicit CSR, in which corporate 
responsibility mechanisms is viewed as most appropriate for issues 
close to the core economic activity of the firm, and often as an aspect of 
state-initiated collective responsibility mechanism.  
If this is the case, the question is if the model of explicit expansionist 
CSR holds the potential to undermine political institutions of Western 
liberal pluralist democracies while this manifestation of CSR is most 
practiced and suggested within a context of inadequate institutional pre-
requisites for CSR. The implication of manifestations of explicit 
expansionist CSR for the institutional and political order of Western 
democracies has – of course – to be given an empirical answer. 
                                                 
37 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008) 
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However, from an institutional point of view, the potential implications 
for practice of changing discourses (e.g., Green, Li, and Nohria, 2009; 
Hajer, 1995; Maguire and Hardy, 2006; March and Olsen, 1989; 
Schmidt, 2010; Zilber, 2002) of what is and is not the appropriate role 
and responsibility of business in society must be kept in mind. The 
political discourses – in which business itself is a participant (e.g., Levy 
et al., 2009; Sharif, 2004; Scherer and Palazzo) – of the appropriate role 
and responsibility of business and companies in society have changed. 
For example, in Scandinavian countries, after the 1980s it ceased to be 
inappropriate for business to assume not only an economic but also a 
social and even political role for itself (Byrkjeflot, 2001). The changing 
discourse of CSR also holds the potential to change the very practice 
and functioning of business in society towards assuming a more 
explicit corporate level responsibility for a broad range of social issues. 
It thus also holds the potential for undermining the political institutions 
that constitute the foundation for a political order. 
Instrumental and duty-aligned CSR perspectives can be understood as a 
trend of weakening deeply embedded societal issues political ties, and 
turn them into issues of the market and economy in which notions of 
responsibility are privatised and in general a concern not between 
political institutions and society, but between the autonomous firm and 
the customer. A convergent institutional CSR perspective constitutes a 
frame of reference from which this trend can be critically evaluated and 
from which discussion about the re-institutionalisation of state 
responsibility, political authority and democratic politics can take 
place, and thus the de-institutionalisation of neo-liberal explicit 
expansionist CSR logics emphasising voluntary exchange, competitive 
markets and private contracts. 
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